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The prospects for the establishment of a system of developmental local government in
South Africa appear to be dim. This dissertation examines development delivery in the
broader state/market debate. From this debate a clear role is developed for local
government as an agent of delivery. This type of local government is characterised by
strength and a developmental outlook. An analysis is provided of the history of local
government, as well as the legislation and policy that has been out in place to facilitate
the transition between apartheid and post-apartheid local government. Through a series
of interviews, participant knowledge and data collection, an assessment of the Mooi
River TLC is made in terms of its strength and its developmental outlook. The future of
local government is found to be constrained by a historical legacy as well as by the
actions of groupings inside and outside the local sphere.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
One of the key challenges facing post-apartheid South Africa is the delivery of
development. Meeting this challenge is essential for the continued well being of the
country's economy and the maintenance of a legitimate democratic order. Delivery of
employment opportunities, social facilities, housing and service infrastructure has not
occurred at the rate envisaged by the political parties seeking power in 1994.
The new regime has experienced difficulty in coming to terms with its transition from
liberation movement to governing party. The pre-election targets set for the delivery of
housing and employment delivery have not been achieved. Delivery of development has
not occurred at the rate anticipated by the post 1994 government.
A number of reasons for these delays have been postulated and these include the
inexperience of the newly elected politicians, lack of co-operation of old order officials,
corruption and nepotism. Consideration also needs to be given to deeper, more
pervasive structural issues, such as the difference between the perceived and actual
roles of the various spheres of government.
While the amendment of statutes and the introduction of social policy that focuses on
issues of equity and justice is a relatively easy exercise, changing the culture of
government is a much harder one. Many of the laws that have been promulgated and
the policy that has been produced since 1994 have their roots in a particular
understanding of the role of government. This understanding has not always been
shared by the general public, by the implementing agents of this legislation and policy, or
by the various spheres of government itself.
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1. 1 A Problem Statement
The role of local government in particular has been understood in a new way by the post
apartheid regime. Legislation such_as the Local Government Transition Act (Act 209 of
1993), the Local Government Transition Act Second Amendment Act (Act 89 of 1995),
the Development Facilitation Act (DFA) (Act 67 of 1995), and the March 1998 White
Paper on Local Government reconceptualise the role of local government in the political
and developmental landscape.
Where as previously local government sought either to entrench the position of a
privileged few, or to maintain control over the impoverished masses, local government is
now envisaged as an organ of the state capable of playing a pivotal role in the delivery
of development1 . Moreover, it is clear from the local government legislation and policy
that local government cannot shift from the "politics of control" to the "politics of
development" without being empowered to do so.
To this end the legislation and policy mentioned above has put in place a series of tools
which have the primary function of shifting the focus of local government and enabling it
to meet its new developmental mandate. These tools include the notion of integrated
development planning and performance management.
These tools are "perceived as a mechanism for overcoming the inadequacies of the past
and repositioning local government within its new developmental mode"
(Pycroft,1998:155). Developmental local government is envisaged to be the form of local
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government that will be entrenched in the next local government elections and is
expected to become the primary vehicle for the delivery of development (Pycroft, 1998).
The desired outcome of transforming local government into more developmentally
focussed institutions may indeed occur. However, this is not to say that a transformed
and increasingly developmentally focussed local government is one that will be
successful at delivering development. While the tools may exist to make developmental
local government a reality, legislators and policy makers have assumed that
developmental local government is an appropriate form of local government, both in
terms of delivery and in terms of the management of local areas. It has also been
assumed that developmental local government can be universally applied throughout the
country.
The problem therefore is posed as to the prospects that a more developmentally
focussed form of local government has in post apartheid South Africa. This problem
needs to be considered from two angles. Consideration needs to be given to the
characteristics of developmental local government that make it a desirable form of local
government. In other words the prospects for developmental local government can be
understood in terms of inherent characteristics.
Furthermore, examination is also required of the constraints on local government
imposed by the legacy of apartheid and the legacy of the transition period. It is further
postulated that developmental local government will be ineffective and inefficient while
the relationships between actors at the regional, provincial, national and global level
, The concept of development for now can be crudely defined as the provision of and increased access to employment
opportunities, social faCIlities and service Infrastructure. This definition will be refined later, particularly with regard to its
relationship to local government.
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remain unclear. While these dynamics exist developmental local government cannot be
implemented in the same manner across the country. This dissertation suggests a
number of preconditions that need to occur before developmental local government can
be meaningfully implemented.
1.2 Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of six chapters, which build on an understanding of the role of
local government in the governance milieu as well as the shifts that have taken place in
South Africa in terms of local government legislation and policy.
The second chapter examines why developmental local government is necessary. This
question is placed within the broader debate of the relationship between the state and
society. The notion of "market failure" is proposed as a rationale for the need for
developmental local government. This analysis is contrasted to the idea of the "failure of
the state" in order to gain a balanced view of the dynamics between the two institutions.
The chapter concludes with a discussion as to why the local arena is seen to be
important in terms of the delivery of development.
Chapter Three examines the nature of local government and its role within the broader
state milieu. The factors that enable local government to carve a niche for itself in the
face of encroachment by other spheres of government are examined. Furthermore, the
role of local government as an agent of delivery is elaborated on and an analysis .is
presented of the characteristics that local government institutions require in order to play
this role.
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The context in which local government in South Africa has developed is set out in
Chapter Four. This examination has two essential elements viz. a historical analysis of
the role of local government in the apartheid era, as well as an analysis of shifts in the
thinking of the new regime after 1994. This chapter includes an analysis of the two Local
Government Acts (Act 209 of 1993, and 89 of 1995), the so-called "Municipal Trinity" and
the White Paper on Local Government. This analysis reveals the impact of the legacy of
apartheid and the limits of reform on the transformation of local government structures.
The case study presented in Chapter Five looks at the Mooi River Transitional Local
Council (TLC) in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands and its development dilemma. The
analysis of the development challenge facing the Mooi River TLC highlights the
constraints that limit the ability of the TLC to fulfil its developmental mandate.
The final chapter draws some conclusions with regard to the factors that have prevented
local government from fulfilling its mandate during the post apartheid transition period.
1.3 Research Methodology
The initial chapters of this dissertation draw on a review of relevant literature relating to
local government. This literature review is used to identify the key debates that arise
around local government transition. The elements of transition that arise out of these
debates are then applied to South Africa, by contextualising them within a historical
analysis of the roles and functions of local government in the apartheid era. Critical
analysis of relevant legislation and policy is also used to establish a conceptual
framework in which the case studies can be examined.
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The case studies draw information from both primary and secondary information
sources. Among primary sources are key informants, such as local authority officials,
consultants, academics and colleagues, as well as the Development Plans drawn up for
the Mooi River TLC. Participant assessment also forms an important source of
information, as the author has been involved in the development of a number of lOPs in
South and Southern Africa. Secondary sources mainly take the form of research done by
colleagues and consultants in the process of drawing up the plans. Supporting
documentation acquired in the process of drawing up the development plans has also
been accessed, and is also an important secondary source of information.
1.4 Assumptions and Problems
Only a single case study has been used in investigating the prospects for developmental
local government. This is problematic, as far as it prevents a comparison between urban
settlements of varying sizes and functions. The Mooi River TLC has been chosen due to
a variety of factors which, on the surface, would seem to suggest that its is well poised to
implement its developmental mandate in a sustainable and meaningful way. The fact
that a settlement with the potential of the Mooi River TLC is unable to full its
developmental mandate raises questions about the ability of less significant TLCs to
fulfill even their basic mandates of service provision.
The choice of the Mooi River TLC as the case study has Cl number of limitations. These
limitations are primarily due to the nature and characteristics of the Mooi River TLC. The
findings relate specifically to a small town that plays a particular role in the regional
space economy of the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands. Ideally, in order to gain a better
understanding of the prospects for developmental local government in South Africa as a
8
whole, further investigations should be undertaken both in other provinces and across
the urban hierarchy.
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Chapter 2: States, Markets and Development Delivery
2.1 Introduction
In order to provide a basis for an understanding of the importance, or perceived
importance of local government in terms of developmental objectives, it is necessary to
consider the state/market debate. The way in which the tension between these two
seemingly opposed concepts is resolved informs to a large degree the nature and role of
local government. Analysis of this debate is further made necessary, due to the fact that
development and the state have in many cases become synonymous with each other.
The state has often been considered by development agencies to be the most obvious
and most useful vehicle of development delivery (Macintosh,1992).
In fact the two concepts are intimately related. The state is seen as the only institution
with both the local knowledge capacity and legitimacy to be able to effectively implement
development. However, the use of the state as the key agent of development has run
into a number of problems, particularly on the African continent. In response to this
arguments have been made that suggest that the market is a more effective agent of
development delivery.
This chapter examines the notions of market failure, which is often used to justify the
need for greater state intervention, and state failure, which is used as basis for arguing
for less state intervention. The tensions and dynamics between these two concepts are
then discussed in an attempt to frame the state/market debate in a manner that will
potentially shed light on the role of local government in defining and achieving
development objectives. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of this
partial resolution for the local government debate.
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2.2 The State - A Theoretical Perspective
The argument for state intervention is premised on a particular understanding of the role
of the state and the manner in which it functions. Similarly, the argument for allowing the
market to provide is based on a specific approach to the functioning and objectives of
the state. In order to understand the problem of the state, a brief summary of two
approaches to the functioning of the state is necessary. These two approaches form a
useful framework in which the dynamics and failings of the state can be understood.
2.2. 1 The Public Interest State
The public interest conception of the state was very popular from after the Second World
War until the early seventies. In its simplest form, this approach to understanding the
state has three essential components (Mackintosh,1992). Firstly, it assumes that society
is a homogenous entity. Due to this homogeneity, society pursues has a single agenda
and pursues a range of common goals. This uniform agenda is most often referred to in
the literature as 'the public interest'.
The second assumption of the public interest state is based on the perceived existence
of a public interest. Due to its position in society, the state is seen to be the only
institution capable of precisely identifying the public interest and clearly articulating this
agenda.
The final assumption of the public interest state school assumes that that having
identified the public interest and articulating its agenda, the state then seeks to
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implement this agenda. This implementation occurs by means of its programmes and
policies.
Based on these three assumptions, it is fairly easy to argue that if the state is in a
position to act in the public interest, it is also the institution that is best equipped in terms
of its command over human and natural resources to implement development. A further
assumption existing that the notion of development is consistent with the public interest.
In summary, it can be said that the public interest state intrinsically has perfect
knowledge of the needs and wants of the people it serves and is therefore in the best
position to rationally, effectively and efficiently distribute resources. The distribution, or
rather the redistribution of resources, is one of the many definitions of the notion of
development. Consequently the state is perceived to be a key agent in a "process of
dynamic change" that results in development (Hadjor, 1993:100).
The public interest view of the state dominated economic and developmental thinking
until the early 1980s (Lipton et al,1993). The notion of a benevolent state able to
adequately act in the public interest began to be increasingly questioned and the
underlying assumptions of the public interest state began to receive more careful
scrutiny.
At the most fundamental level the conception of society as a homogenous entity is
seriously flawed. The assertion that the society is a homogenous entity is also open to
heavy criticism. While this assertion may have had some truth in it in pre-industrial
western society, it has become less and less the case, particularly in developed
countries. Klitgaard (1994) asserts that there are only seven homogenous states in the
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world. Homogeneity in this case is indicated as the absence of border disputes. Six of
these states are located in western Europe, while the seventh is Japan. Collectively
these seven states only comprise four percent of the world's population. Furthermore, all
these states can be considered to de developed countries.
This assumption of homogeneity becomes even more questionable when applied to the
context of the developing world, where nation states as political entities are not the
product of organic growth and natural development but are rather artificially created
entities imposed by colonising powers. The state in less developed countries often takes
the form of a dynamic array of religious, political and economic groupings competing for
a small pool of resources (Klitgaard,1994). Clearly these groupings are not pursuing a
common agenda. This fragmentation and the resulting competition for resources is a
legacy of the colonisation of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America undertaken
by western European powers in the late nineteenth century, joined by the United States
in the first half of the twentieth century (Hadjor, 1993).
The fact that society is not a homogenous entity, but rather consists of a range of
competing interests and groups, makes it difficult to define a single public interest. The
public interest state therefore needs to default to a proxy measure in order to define an
agenda which it can pursue. This proxy measure is usually related to the degree to
which the market is able to function without hindrance or intervention (World Bank,1997).
The argument is that the more that the market is prone to failure and distortions in terms
of resource allocations, the more it is necessary to bring the market back in line with the
public interest. The public interest state is considered to be the institution that is ideally
placed to be able to do this as it has perfect knowledge of the public interest. The state
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therefore (re)acts in response to market failure in order to assist the market to function
without distortions.
The notion of a public interest state also comes under attack from the political left. The
radical critique of this stance points out that the public interest does not in fact reflect the
broader interests of society, but rather the narrow interests of the capitalist classes that
are in power (Edwards et ai, 1978, Mackintosh 1992). The capitalist classes in a position
of power, use the state to manipulate the market in order to further their aims of
accumulation. This is not to say that other classes do not benefit from state activity but
rather to say that the capitalist classes benefit most. The benefits accruing to other
classes are essentially 'spillover' benefits (Edwards et ai, 1978).
It is also important to note that the state does not act in the interest of an individual
capitalist, but rather in the general interest of the capitalist classes as a whole (Edwards
et ai, 1978). The drive to accumulate that motivates capitalism activities has resulted in a
continued expansion of capitalism. This growth of capitalism has also resulted in the
growth of the state, as it seeks to further the interests of larger capital empire but also to
deal with the increasing social dissonance. This social dissonance is also seen to be a
result of unfettered capitalist expansion (Edwards et al,1978).
Marxists view the state as being a limited public interest state that is developmental in
nature only as far as negative externalities from capitalist expansion are concerned. The
state pursues the agenda of the class that is in power, which is usually either a fUlly
fledged capitalist class or a class of incumbent capitalists. Therefore, the state can never
be truly developmental because of its narrow focus on supporting the accumulation
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drives of the capitalist classes. These classes are already wealthy and do not need
development.
2.2.2 The Private Interest State
In the early seventies, the public interest state increasingly began to lose currency and
theorist began to look for alternatives based on a critical analysis of the assumptions of
the public interest state. In particular the notion of a public intere~t was more closely
examined and a theory of state based on a heteroge.neous society was developed.
This view of the state disputes the assertion that the state will act in the public interest as
it disputes the existence of the levels of consensus that could form such a public
interest. It argues that society consists of individuals that seek to maximise their own
individual benefits either in monetary or other terms. Every individual therefore has a
different competing agenda. The state cannot pursue this wide range of agendas
effectively, and as a result defaults to the pursuit of the agendas of those elected to the
state, or who serve the state in an official capacity (Mackintosh, 1992; Hughes,1993).
The private interest view of the state also questions the agendas and motivation of those
that run the state (Hughes,1993). It is argued that officials and politicians pursue their
own agendas as much as individuals not involved with the state. This is used as the
basis to argue for less state involvement as individuals that are part of the state have
access to resources and power that most individuals do not have access to. The result is
that individuals connected to the state have an unfair advantage when it comes to
competition in the market.
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Market failure is therefore seen as a result of 'too much state' rather than too little state.
This introduces the notion of state failure as opposed to market failure. Supporters of the
public interest state argue that the market does not work properly, therefore intervention
by the state is necessary in order to bring the activities of the market in line with the
public interest. The private interest state theorists make the argument that market failure
is a result of excessive state intervention, and should therefore be termed state failure.
The private interest state is a pro market response to the problems of government.
From the writings of a range of theorists, Mackintosh (1992) distills three types of
dynamics that result in state failure. Unlike the public interest approach to the nature of
the state, the private interest view looks more closely at the internal dynamics of the
state rather than just how the state interacts with broader society.
The first dynamic identified by Mackintosh (1992) is termed the economic theory of
bureaucracy. The state is seen as being divided up into a number of monopolies which
compete amongst one another for resources (Mackintosh, 1992; Hughes, 1993). These
monopolies take the form of government departments, which covet particular skills and
information. These monopolies then act in their own self interest by trying to maximise
their own access to resources, while restricting the access of other departments to the
same resources.
State monopolies pursue their own agendas and interests. These interests include
higher remuneration for officials and associated perks of office such as housing and
education subsidies (Niskanen in Mackintosh,1992). When political principles are at
stake, this pursuit of self interest is extended to include the enhancement of public
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reputation, the extension of power bases and the consolidation of networks of patronage
(Niskanen in Mackintosh,1992).
The natural result of this is an increase in size of these monopolies in terms of budget,
staff complement and in many cases the extension of their mandate, and a decrease in
efficiency. This process of bureaucratisation is often advanced as an important reason
for institutional failure in Africa.
The copious development of networks of patronage is often put forward as a major
contributing factor to the bureaucratisation of the African state (Harsch,1993). These
networks are usually nepotistic in nature, although they often extend beyond family
networks to other important contacts. People are often employed in the state sector due
to their political connections, and not because of their ability to do a job, if they even do
any work at all.
Related to the phenomenon of increased bureaucratisation is the concept of the
Leviathan State, originally conceptualised by Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth
century in his book "The Leviathan State" (Wordsworth Encyclopedia,1995). The
Leviathan State is a monopolistic, absolutist and all powerful entity. Hobbes viewed a
state of this nature as the only way in which to maintain order and keep control over
society (Wordsworth Encyclopedia,1995).
Modern theorists acknowledge the existence of large states but generally do not view
them as being the desirable institutions portrayed by Hobbes. Part of the reason for this
has been the drive by the developed world to encourage the development of democratic
systems of gover!1ment in the developing world, particularly since the end of the cold war
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(Robinson,1993;World Bank,1997). A large and unwieldy state is increasingly seen to be
an obstacle to development. One of the key functions of any state is to distribute
resources in the absence, or seeming absence, of the market to do this in an effective,
equitable and efficient manner. The existence of a large state, particularly one that is
staffed with a particular interest group, results in the crowding out of other groups. These
'extra-state' groups often struggle to make meaningful progress towards development,
as they are unable to access the basic resources necessary to manage their way
through the bureaucracy of a large state system. These groups are in many cases the
most vulnerable in society and the nature of the mode of operation of large state
structures means that they are likely to remain vulnerable (Hughes,1993; Munro et
al,1999).
In addition to crowding out activities, another key dynamic in the private interest stake is
the economic phenomenon of rent seeking (Hughes,1993). Begg et al (1991: 187)
defines economic rent as "the extra payment a factor receives over and above the
transfer earnings required to induce the factor to supply its services in that use". The
concept of economic rent when applied to the analysis of the state sector refers to the
benefits derived from state activity. These benefits are not only accrued by those
working within the state system, but can also be exploited by outsiders.
The existence of these potential benefits distorts the market and encourages the
realignment of economic activity. The act of realignment of economic activity in itself is
uneconomic and imposes costs on society. Furthermore, the existence of economic
rents created by the state and the presence of people pursuing their own private
interests, creates a fertile ground for the abuse of state power and the proliferation of
corruption.
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North (1989) acknowledges that human nature being what it is means that the way in
which states operate will primarily be determined by the manner in which people pursue
their own state interest. He further notes that the interactions between individuals in the
pursuit of their self interest are extremely complex, and have great potential for conflict
(North, 1989). This complexity needs to be managed by an institution based on a set of
rules. These rules are based on a set of norms, which it can be argued, is alternative
terminology for the public interest.
The debate regarding the respective roles of the market and the state seems to have
come full circle without being satisfactorily resolved. What this debate has made clear is
that state failure can make a significant contribution to the non-delivery of development.
Similarly, market failure has also resulted in low levels of development.
The following section attempts, at least at a theoretical level, to resolve the state/market
debate by combining elements of the public interest state with the private interest state.
2.3 Market or State: One, Both or None?
North (1989) makes the point that the form of state institution and the way in which it
evolves has a profound effect on the development path of a country. The preceding
analysis suggests that there is very little agreement on whether state should play a
leading role in the development process, or whether it should be left to the market and
its 'invisible hand'.
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The preceding discussion also made it clear that there are some things that the state
does badly, and there are some things that the state does well. Similarly, the market is
good at providing certain types of goods, and notoriously bad at providing other types of
goods. The state and the market have two distinctly different, but no less valid roles to
play in the development of delivery. International development organisations such as the
World Bank have gradually come to this realisation during the last decade of the
twentieth century (Munro et a/,1999).
Streeten (1993) presents an argument that attempts this trade off, albeit from the
position that the current trend towards state minimal ism is problematic. However, this
attempt can be criticized as being problematic due to the fact that the two concepts are
derived from fundamentaliy different theoretical bases.
The trend towards state minimalism can be equated with a laissez-faire approach to
governance and the free and open operation of markets. Smaller government means
less intervention in markets and therefore less distortion in market activity. This
approach is premised on the fundamental assumption that the source of all distortions is
to be found in the state sector (Streeten, 1993).
Streeten (1993) argues that markets are not the benevolent distributors of resources that
they are assumed to be. He argues that markets are in fact neutral institutions that
operate on the basis of a set of laws that make no consideration of the morality or
immorality of actions. The role of the state therefore is to ensure that the market
operates in a manner that is 'people friendly'. The state needs to facilitate social justice
and the allocation of resources to all groupings within society. In other words, the state
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needs to act in the public interest by assisting markets to function in a just and equitable
manner.
This facilitation of justice and equity can be achieved by the state acting in a number of
areas. The state is in the position to limit exploitation of factors of production through the
provision of a legal framework and legislative environment that encourages law and
order (Streeten, 1993). This is necessary in order to limit the social costs arising from
rent seeking that occurs due to individuals taking advantage of market distortions.
It can also be argued that not all distortions occur as the result of state intervention, and
there are some intrinsic characteristics of the way in which markets function that need to
be dealt with. The most obvious of the these is the development of monopolies, which in
many cases bring with them a social cost (Streeten, 1993; 8egg et aI, 1991).
Streeten (1993: 1283) argues that "the virtue of markets depends on the existence of
competition" as it is able to minimise social costs if it is operating properly. The problem
of a large social cost can be looked at in two ways. Firstly, it represents an opportunity
cost in that these resources could be channelled into activities that have a net social
benefit rather than accumulating as monopoly profit. Secondly, the distribution of
resources in an economy is impacted as far as issues of equity and justice are
concerned, when a market activity incurs a social cost (8egg et aI, 1991).
The state also has a role to play in preventing the growth of inequalities (Streeten,
1993). The prevention of the growth of inequalities occurs in two senses. Firstly, the
state is responsible for ensuring that vulnerable and marginalised groups have access to
resources. Secondly, the state is responsible for developing the planning, institutional
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and infrastructural framework for the development of both growing and lagging regions.
These frameworks exist to stimulate the economies of these areas and to crowd in
private sector investment.
Finally, the state is responsible for the development of human resources in its broadest
sense (Streeten,1993). This is done by the provision of public goods such as education
and health care, but also includes activities of the state aimed at the re-skilling of the
unemployed and public works programmes. Agricultural extension services also fall into
this broad definition of human resource development (Streeten, 1993).
Four broad conclusions can be drawn from Streeten's (1993) arguments. Firstly, it is
difficult to reconcile the range of functions that is considered critical to the functioning of
the state with what is usually perceived of as the minimalist state.
Secondly, Streeten (1993) recognises that markets are as prone to imperfections and
distortions as states are. The need is not to choose between states and markets but
rather two look at the two institutions and assess how they can be brought together in a
workable arrangement. As a starting point it is suggested that the ruthless efficiency of
the market needs to be tempered with the social conscience of the state.
Thirdly, there are synergies between the activities of the public and private sector that
can be exploited (Streeten,1993). The various spatial development initiatives currently
occurring in and around South Africa are based on this premise. The state after having
identified a previously disadvantaged area with high potential, embarks on a major
infrastructural investment programme, and provides institutional support for would be
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investors. This investment by the state is intended to develop an environment that is
attractive to investors.
While there are undoubtedly benefits from an alliance of ~jtate and market, this alliance
does not occur easily. Furthermore, market and the state are often cast against each
other in an adversarial manner. The actions that they undertake in this context often
results in them undermining and weakening each other. There is clearly a need for a
third institution that will bring together the state and the market and facilitate their
interactions. Streeten (1993) sees civil society as fulfilling this role.
Civil society is ideally placed to be able to temper the excesses of the state and the
market. It often catches the issues that fall through the gaps of state policy and market
activity. Civil society serves to conscientise the state to its own excesses as well as the
excesses of the market (Streeten, 1993). Organs of civil society tend to operate a more
local level than those of the state and the market, and consequently are seen to have
more legitimacy and a better understanding of the dynamics of society than these
institutions.
Finally, Streeten (1993) points out that market failure is not necessarily a valid argument
for state intervention or vice versa. Other institutions also have a role to play, particularly
when it comes to development delivery. This dissertation argues in its subsequent
chapters that it is not just the non-state institutions of civil society that have a role to
play, but that other forms of the state, particularly local forms, are critical to the success
of development projects and programmes.
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Chapter 3: Local Government and the Delivery of Development
3. 1 Introduction
So far the debate regarding the delivery of development has focussed on the role of the
market and the state, with some mention of the potential role of civil society. This
discussion essentially conceptualises the state as a monolithic, centralised institution of
governance. However, most political systems, sociaiist and capitalist, have a
manifestation of the state at a local level. This local level of the state can be constituted
in many different ways, and may exercise varying degrees of power.
It can generally be said that the central state is usually responsible for the setting of the
macro political, economic and institutional framework. This framework sets the
parameters for the development of policies and programmes, that when implemented,
will result in the achievement of the state's objectives. Responsibility for the
implementation of those programmes and policies is usually delegated to lower levels of
government, although this is not always the case.
This chapter looks at the phenomenon of local government. A number of definitions of
local government are used as the starting point for this discussion. The role of local
government in the overall system of government is also explored, as is the potential for
the physical delivery of development.
This chapter then goes onto explore the some of the conditions under which local
government could be able to fulfil this potential. This is done by examining the concepts
of "strong local government" and "developmental local government", as they are
understood in the local and international literature.
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The chapter concludes by examining the concept of strong development local
government in the light of the state-market debate, and attempting to define some
themes and criteria by which the efficiency and effectiveness of a local government
system could be tested.
3.2 The Concept of Local Government
It can be argued that local government takes such a wide variety of forms that it cannot
be adequately defined. However, there are a number of elements of local government
that make it quite unique and are useful in giving some form to the concept. The,
definitions that follow pick up on some of these elements.
Firstly, and perhaps most obviously local government is government at a local level. In
other words, local government is~ component of a state system that derives its authority
from the state, and operates at a local level.
Scruton (1982:274) picks up this element of the devolution of central state power when
he defines local government as "a public organisation authorised to decide and
administer a limited range of public policies pertaining to Cl circumscribed territory within
a larger and sovereign jurisdiction". However, this devolution may take many forms and
the type and extent of the power devolved to the local level may also vary. In the former
USSR, local government was purely administrative in nature and functioned merely as a
field agency of central government. Theoretically at least, local government in the former
USSR would not be considered to be true local government as it had no discretionary
powers and operated largely as a field agency of central government (Scruton,1982).
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The other extreme can be observed in France where local government has been granted
extensive powers of legislation, largely due to a parallel process of largely due to the
system of delegating power to mayors (Scruton,1982).
The issue of discretionary and legislative powers is further developed in the following
definition. Local government is that "part of government dealing mainly with matters
concerning the inhabitants of a particular area or town, usually financed in part by lo~
taxes" (Wordsworth Encyclopedia, 1995:1298t Local government is characterised by its
...----
ability to derive an income from local sources, usually in the form of a property tax. The
mandate from central government which allows a local authority to raise taxes can either
be direct i.e. legislated at a national level, or indirect i.e. as a result of locally
promulgated laws and regulations.
There is also an element of reciprocity in the presence of a local government system,
which allows local government to play a developmental role. In return for income from
the local community, local government is expected to provide various types of public
services. Cox (1994: 1) picks up this element of reciprocity in her definition of local
government:
"Local government is that tier of government or decision making which operates
specifically at a local level dealing with grassroots and tangible issues which affect
people in their everyday lives, such as rates and taxes, water provision, all
services to properties and representation of local issues and communities at
regional and national level".
Having established the broad parameters of what local government is and what it does,
the question of why local government is seen to be important needs to be examined.
Cox's (1994) definition indicates that local government is responsible for lobbying other
levels of government on behalf of the community it serves. Due to the fact that
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disadvantaged and marginalised groups within local communities are often voiceless,
this advocacy role becomes a critical one in the delivery of development. The advocacy
activity of local government gives it an important place in the overall system of
governance, and is one of the fundamental reasons for the existence of local
government.
Thomas-Slayter (1994) argues that local government has a critical role to play in
environmental sustainability. Efforts at securing environmental sustainability need to take
place within a broader policy framework. Agenda 21, which aims to achieve
environmental sustainability at a global level forms this macro framework and was
initiated by the United Nations at the earth Summit in Rio in 1992 (Urban Econ et
a/,1997). Agenda 21 recognises that sustainable development at a global scale requires
implementation of sustainable development at a local scale. Hence a programme has
been developed that is based on Agenda 21 that is called Local Agenda 21.
Local Agenda 21 programmes look specifically at ensuring that the economic
development, community development and ecological development that occurs at the
local level is sustainable (Urban Econ et al,1997). The principles of Local Agenda 21
include operating within ecological limits, partnerships between stakeholders,
accountability of those stakeholders, participation and transparency, systemic approach,
equity and justice, and a concern for the future. The Local Agenda 21 programme
highlights the importance of the relationship of local government with other levels of
government and groupings in society for development.
The principles espoused in Local Agenda 21 do not directly refer to local government.
However, local authorities are seen to be one of the key stakeholders that need to be
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intimately involved in implementing Local Agenda 21 programmes. It is argued that the
provision of services by local government has an extensive impact on economic,
community and ecological systems (UrbanEcon et al,1997). Sustainable development at
a local level therefore depends on ensuring that these service networks and the
provIsIon of services do not undermine these economic, community and ecological
systems.
Local areas need to be effectively governed because of the role they play in the
development, or underdevelopment, of their hinterlands (Thomas-Slayter,1994).
Although local government is often urban in nature, development of local government
areas can induce development in surrounding more rural areas. This is not merely due
to a trickle down income redistribution effect, although undoubtedly this does take place.
Urban areas are also able to supply markets and social facilities such as health and
welfare services, which impact directly on rural livelihoods.
Local government is also important from the point of view of physical delivery of
development. As is the case with ecological concerns, development policy and
legislation is usually established at macro level and forms the terms of reference for
implementation at the local level. This involvement at grassroots level makes local
government a key interface between the 'governors and the governed'.
Local government is often seen by the central state as a dumping ground for difficult
mandates (Thomas-Slayter, 1994). Powers are often devolved to the local level by
central government that allow them to deal with issues that are politically sensitive at the
central state level. In this way the blame for the implementation of unpopular policies is
directed at local government rather than the central state.
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3.3 The Arguments for Strong Local Government
While the presence of local government in the political economy cannot be denied there
is vigorous debate over the form it should take and the roles that it should play. In
particular, this debate is focussed on the relationships between the local level of
government and other levels of government.
Christianson et al (1993) argues that not only is local government a good thing, but that
it is a key element in the post apartheid reconstruction of South Africa. The
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) identified local government as
being a key factor in its success or failure, particularly as far as the delivery of services is
concerned (African National Congress,1994). The RDP also identified the need for
transformation in the local government sector (African National Congress, 1994). The
reason for this transformation imperative and the manner in which this process has been
undertaken is examined in greater detail in the following chapter.
Christianson (1994) argues that the key determinant of local government effectiveness is
its 'strength'. The need for strong local government can be justified in a number of ways.
Christianson (1994) identifies three primary justifications for strong local government that
relate directly to each other.
Firstly, strong local government has a role to play in the extension of democratic practice
into broader society. The RDP correctly identifies local government as being "the level of
representative democracy closest to the people" (African National Congress, 1994:129).
Local government is also usually small and is therefore in a position to articulate the
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needs of the local population (Christianson,1994). Local government is a key element of
a broad-based participatory democracy and a source of ideas and pressures for the
development of policy. The local level is where "Joe and Jane Citizen" can directly
participate in the democratic system and where they can experience the results of their
participation in a direct manner.
Furthermore, the proximity of local government to local community groupings gives it the
potential to be responsive to the needs articulated by those groupings. The potential
therefore also exists for local government to play an advocacy role by approaching other
spheres of government on behalf of local communities.
Secondly, international development agencies, the World Bank in particular, has
increasingly recognised good governance as a key variable in the process of
development (Christianson, 1994; Clapham, 1996, Barya, 1993). The role of the local level
of government in the reconstruction of post-apartheid South Africa has been
acknowledged by the World Bank as critical to successful development (World Bank,
1993). The local level is where the delivery of development in the form of services, social
facilities or economic opportunities actually occurs in a physical form. It follows therefore
the stronger local government is, the more vigorously it will be able to pursue a
developmental agenda and the higher the rate of development delivery will be.
The role of local government can be taken further than merely being the agent of
delivery of services and infrastructure. In South Africa this delivery is placed within the
broader political imperative of the redistribution of resources to formerly disadvantaged
areas and communities. The success or failure of local government, therefore, will have
a direct impact on the credibility of the ruling party at a national level.
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Finally, and linked closely to the notion that strong local governm
ent entrenches
democratic practices in society, particularly at the local level, is the idea
that strong local
government encourages "institutional pluralism" (Christianson,1994
). Institutional
pluralism relates to the national governmental context and refers to the te
nsion, in terms
of power and influence, between local government and other sphe
res or tiers of
government. Strong local government is necessary as a "countervailin
g force against
centrist domination" (Christianson,1994:40). It is envisaged that
a strong local
government system forms part of the system of checks and balances th
at prevents the
erosion of democracy at a local level. However, in order to play
this role, local
government needs a measure of independence and delegated power.
A number of other arguments have also been made that support the desi
rability of strong
local government. For the most part these arguments are the logical e
xtension of the
three basic arguments that local government extends democracy, is nec
essary for good
governance and restrains the power of central government. However, t
hese arguments
tend to be problematic as they can also be used to argue against the
need for strong
local government.
Strong local government has been seen to be a critical component o
f ensuring free
market competition and the effective operation of the market (Cox,1994)
. This argument
defines the role of local government to be the creation of an enabling
environment for
economic development. However, there is a counter argument to this th
at suggests that
the 'rules' for investment are set at national and provincial level an
d consequently
constrain the ability of local government to engage with the market in a
manner that is
always conducive to investment.
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The presence of strong local government within the political economy is not always seen
to be a good thing. It is often the case that functions and powers that the central state is
unable to manage is devolved to lower levels of government, particularly to the local
level. The devolution of these powers and function can be funded or unfunded. In both
cases, local governments often struggle to fulfil these devolved mandates due to
capacity problems and resources constraints. When local government is successful in
the fulfilment of these mandates, the central state often responds by returning the
responsibilities for those powers and functions to the national level (Thomas-
Slayter,1994).
The concentration of political power at the local level, not only threatens the power base
of the central state, but can also result in the extension of networks of clientalism and
patronage under the right conditions (Cox, 1994). The presence of corruption at the local
level undermines democracy and the ability of local government to be responsive to the
needs of the local population.
The issue of corruption is closely linked to the development of a class of new urban
elites. These elites are usually newly empowered and have little experience of
governance and development. Cox (1994) suggests that in the face of this inexperience
in the use of political, local government becomes a potentially fertile breeding ground for
the growth of corruption.
A further argument against the establishment of a strong system of local government is
that a change in political system at national level may have little impact on the perceived
legitimacy of local government. A general lack of legitimacy impacts heavily on the ability
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of local government to be strong due to its need to be intimately in
volved with the
extension of democracy into local structures and its need to be highly re
sponsive to the
demands articulated as a result of that extension. This issue of legitimac
y is particularly
pertinent to the South African context and is looked at in greater detail
in the following
chapter where the history of local government in South Africa is discusse
d.
3.4 The Characteristics of Strong Local Government
From the above discussion, which presents some of the more pertinen
t arguments for
and against strong local government, four key characteristics of strong lo
cal government
can be distilled. These characteristics can be used to measure the s
trength of local
government and its potential effectiveness in the delivery of developmen
t. Furthermore,
the characteristics that determine the strength of a local governmen
t system go far
beyond the notion that the more powerful local government is, the m
ore powers and
functions it is permitted to exercise.
Firstly, the strength of local government can be measured by considerin
g the role that it
plays in the broader government system (Christianson,1994). The wa
y in which the
relationship between local and central government is defined is a key
determinant of
strong local government. In many ways the characteristics of strong lo
cal government
highlights the issue of the devolution of powers and functions. Howev
er, it is not the
number of devolved powers and functions that is critical, but rather the le
vel of autonomy
that local government has in performing those functions. The more that lo
cal government
is able to operate in relative autonomy from other tiers or spheres of g
overnment, the
stronger it can be considered to be.
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Local government is never completely autonomous due to the fundamen
tal fact that it is
an organ of the central state
2
. he strength of local government is reflected in the
influence it has in developing the national framework of governance in
which it has to
operate. Autonomy can be measured by examining the real power that lo
cal government
can exercise in resisting the influence of national' government on local aff
airs.
The second characteristic of strong local government is closely linked to
the first. Strong
local government has the power to levy taxes and raise revenue at
the local level
(Cox,1994). Furthermore, strong local government has the ability to s
pend its locally
raised revenue at the local level. Local government is often prevente
d from deriving
income from any source other than property taxes and profit on
the supply of
engineering services, and could therefore possibly not be considered to b
e strong.
However, the source of local government income is half of the issue.
The stre~gth of
local government can also be judged in terms of its ability to spend loca
l revenue at the
local level in a manner that is responsive to locally articulated needs.
The mandatory
redistribution of revenue income to other spheres of government weaken
s the autonomy
of local government., Likewise, the regulation of local government wit
h regard to the
manner in which locally raised revenues should be disbursed also erode
s the strength of
local government.
Thirdly, strong local government is dependent on high levels of
technical and
administrative capacity within the institution (Christianson et al,1993
). The level of
capacity impacts on the strength of local government in a number of way
s. Low levels of
2 The only possible exception to this is Singapore where the city is th
e state and the national and local levels are
essentially the same.
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capacity puts pressure on the ability of local government to deliver basic services, as
well as precluding the ability of local government to be proactive in dealing with broader
developmental issues such as the establishment and extension of economic activity.
Moreover, where local government is put under pressure to fulfil a mandate for which it
does not have the capacity, technical and administrative assistance is usually sought
with consultants or other spheres of government that do have the required expertise.
The engagement of consultants, in addition to being a potentially costly exercise, may
not always have the desired result. Furthermore, the fees paid to a consultant represent
an opportunity cost to local government.
The use of other spheres of government as a source of technical and administrative
support has the potential to erode the power base of local government. In order to gain
access to the capacity of other spheres of government, local government has to agree to
adjust its activities to be congruent with the aims of the outside institution. This may
directly impact on the ability of local government to be responsive to the local
7 communities, particularly where the aims of the outside agencies are not congruent with
the articulated needs of communities at the local level.
V-
Finally, the arguments for strong local government suggest that a fourth characteristic of
strong 19cal government is that the institution itself, the structures it operates and the
services that it offers are fundamentally d mocr tic. Not only are levels of community
input into local government processes significant, but participation extends to the
inclusion of decision making at the micro level. This level of participation is constrained if
there are low levels of capacity within the community. Low capacity in this case is
defined as low levels of understanding of development processes and their impacts.
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The strength of local government is determined by how democratic it is perceived to be.
Democracy at the local level can be defined by looking at how participation of the
community is integrated into the business of local government. Arnstein (1969) provides
a typology that is of some use in measuring levels of participation. This typology is















Figure 1: Arnstein's (1969) Ladder of Participation
Strong local government is characterised by a democracy that at least allows local
communities to act in partnership with it in the pursuit of its mandate. Partnership in a
participative sense is characterised by _a sharing of power with local communities
(Arnstein,1969). However, it is important to note that often this power sharing dynamic is
a result of local citizens taking power themselves rather than it being given away freely
by a local authority (Arnstein, 1969).
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"Strong local government is the perfect vehicle for managing people centred
development at the grassroots level" (Christianson,1994). The argument for a strong
local government system builds on the previous arguments that local government is
important from the point of view of democracy, delivery and advocacy. In summary, it
can be said that strong local government is characterised by its strength in the following
four areas:
• The role it plays in the broader system of government
• Its ability to raise revenue and to spend that revenue
• The capacity it has to fulfil the role assigned to it
• Its ability to expand democratic practice and extend it to local communities
3.5 Developmental Local Government
Frequent allusions have been made to the possibility that the local level of government is
ideally place to be the key agent of development delivery. The preceding argument has
examined the concept of strong local government. While weak local government can
probably deliver development, strong local government has the potential to enhance the
act of development delivery by strengthening democracy and empowerment. Due to the
enhancement of the development process, it is assumed that ideally developmental local
government should be based on a form of local government that is considered to be
strong.
The concept of development was initially defined in the first chapter of this dissertation
as "the provision of and increased access to employment opportunities, social facilities
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and service infrastructure". This definition is rather crudely constru
cted, but was
necessary as a basis for an initial discussion of the role of the state se
ctor in general,
and the local government sector in particular. It is now necessary to d
evelop a more
refined understanding of the concept of development, its origins, what it
is perceived to
be and what it often is, especially as far as the institution of local
government is
concerned. This understanding combined with an understanding of the
nature of strong
local government provides an insight into the characteristics and dyn
amics of strong
local government.
The notion of development has undergone a number of changes in mea
ning over time.
These changes have often been as a result of different fields of study
examining the
concept and defining in a way that satisfies the outcomes and objective
s of that field of
study.
French evolutionary sociologists and English political economists in the
late eighteenth
and early nineteenth century viewed development as the evolu
tion of society
(Hadjor,1993; Todaro,1989). Anthropologists adopted this approach to s
ocial change in
the late nineteenth century and applied it to non-European societ
y as a means
determining the reasons why European civilisation had advanced an
d that of non-
European society had not (Hadjor,1993).
During the course of the twentieth century, the notion of develo
pment became
increasingly associated with western capitalism and the focus shifted
onto economic
development (Hadjor,1993). Modernisation theory set out a develo
pment path for
countries outside western Europe and North America. The focus of th
e modernisation
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drive is to reproduce the experience of western Europe's industrial revolution in less
developed countries.
It has been increasingly recognised that economic progress is only a single element of
development and consequently concern over lack of development has been extended to
the well being of humanity (Hadjor,1993). This concern is reflected in the human
development index (HDI) developed by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP). The HDI is a composite index that comprise national income, life expectancy,
adult literacy and mean years of schooling (UNDP,1992).
The notion of development, the way that it has been defined and the assumption that it is
desirable in the first place has also been criticised. Most of this criticism is derived from
Marxist core-periphery theory. Development is perceived as an imposition of
industrialised nations that entrenches their position in the global economy at the
expense of less developed countries (Wallerstein,1983; 1994).
While there is no single universal definition for the concept of development, there seems
to be an emerging consensus that development is a process rather than an end state
(Hadjor,1993). There is also recognition that the development path of a particular
country is unique to that country, and therefore can only be determined in the context of
that country's social, economic and political history.
Having established the nature of development in broad terms, it is necessary to look at it
in more detailed terms in order to provide a practical basis for understanding the notion
of developmental local government. The follOWing is a possible definition that draws in
the various components discussed above: Development is a system of economic and
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social processes that reinforce each other to create benefits for and consolidate the
livelihoods of all sectors of society in general, but that focus on vulnerable groups in
particular.
The meaning of development varies significantly between developed countries and
developing countries. What may be considered a life or death issue in a less developed
country, may be taken for granted in a highly industrialised one. The definition proposed
above refers more to an understanding of development in countries outside of western
Europe and North America. Local government in the developed world plays a
developmental role, however this role is based on a very different understanding of the
notion of development that tends to focus on the economic aspects.
The use of a definition that reflects an understanding of development that is more
pertinent to !be developing world is a reflection of the coneeF ef-tt:lis dissertation witb
this reason the above definition, as well as the one alluded to in Chapter One, will be
used as the basis for exploring the role of local government in the implementation of
programmes and projects that directly benefit local communities.
If development is defined in the manner it is above, .9d~ev~e~l.QoQ!!~J1gJJQ£ejLm~:I!:!.r::illmi.£5!!1
guit. e ·ned as the sphere of government
facilitation of deve!.Qgment. For local government to be considered to be deyelopmental it





Is geared to governance rather than government,
Has an explicit focus on resource distribution; ~
•
•
Is entrepreneurial in nature;
Is concerned with the provision of economic, social and engineering se
rvices~
and
• Facilitates development activities by non-governmental bodies by a
cting as an
information-clearing house. @
The definition of development developed in this chapter indicates the in
tricate nature of
development processes. These processes appear to be iterative and con
tinually respond
to each other. These processes are also characterised by a multiplicity
of demands in
terms of resources, technical and administrative capacity, and political im
peratives. The
successful management of these competing demands requires strong loc
al government.
However, developmental local government has characteristics that are n
ot explicitly part
of strong local government. In fact it may be argued that the ch
aracteristics of
developmental local government may in some cases undermine the s
trength of local
---
government. Furthermore, local government may be developmental in
nature, but not
r--- --
1storieal-anf't-----exhibit all of the characteristics set out above. The social, economic,
-~~-----------
political context in which local government operates has an impact o
n the nature of---- ----developmental local overnment (Tomlinson, 1994).
It should be noted that the definition developed earlier in the chapter is
very idealistic,
and not necessarily reflect how local government is perceived in South A
frica. However,
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such a general definition does provide a useful basis for examining the characteristics
and objectives of developmental local government from a theoretical perspective, which
in turn provides a useful benchmark for evaluating the local government system in South
Africa.
The characteristics of developmental local government have up until this point been
alluded to and merit further discussion. Each characteristic is discussed in the order they
appear above.
There has been a shift in terminology as far as the state sector is concerned. Whereas
the state has traditionally conceived as being government, it is now being seen as the
institution responsible for governance. This shift is significant in that it redefines the
state as something that is involved in activity, rather than merely an institution. Hence
the use of a verb rather than a noun to describe the state sector. Furthermore, and
related to the first point, the use of the word governance recognises that the state does
J]ot act alone but that it is part of a dynamic interaction with other actors outside the state
sector, such as private enterprise and community based organisations. TILe need for co-
operation and partnership between government, the private sector and community
organisations therefore becomes critical (Halfani,1997). The term governance also
suggests a shift from linearity and rational structuration towards patterns of chaos
(Swilling, 1997). This in turn reflects the impact of post modernism and its rejection of
the utopian myth of the unification of a homogenous humanity (Swilling, 1997).
Swilling (1997) identifies four approaches to the application of governance. to society.
The first approach is where governance is equated with what he terms the classic liberal
democratic model. This approach is generally favoured by international development
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and aid agencies that are trying to reproduce the desirable elemehts of the state, which
they perceive to be lacking in under developed countries. These elements include the
"separation of powers, Bill of Rights, federal intergovernmental arrangements,
independent judiciary, limited role for the state, neutral and effective public service, and
political pluralism" (Swilling,1997:4)
The second approach to governance emphasises the relationships between the state
sector and civil society. This approach argues that the rationale for democratic
governance is to secure the participation of civil society in decision making and policy
formulation activities (Swilling, 1997). The role of the state sector in this case is to
facilitate the empowerment of civil society in a manner that will enable them to play their
designated role.
Thirdly, the concept of governance is also subject to a Marxist critique which views
governance as a ideological tool that is used by the developed nations of the west to
entrench and extend their economic and political hegemony over less developed nations
(Swilling, 1997). This argument highlights the shift in the aims of development over time.
In the 1960 and earlier, the application of modernisation theory suggested" that
development would lead to a stable, democratic political system. However, increasingly
stable, democratic political systems are being touted as a precondition for successful
development and this agenda is being pursued through the insistence on an institutional
reform component in structural adjustment packages (Barya, 1993;Clapham,1996).
Finally, there is the argument that "governance is the conscious management of regime
structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm" (Swilling,1997:5).
This approach to the concept of governance is perhaps the most useful to consider at a
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local level, since it deals with the way the state manages its own activities as well as its
relations with civil society.
Swilling (1997) identifies the following properties of governance. Bonds of trust between
the various actors in the civic state arena is critical to effective governance. This trust
serves as an incentive to participate in the interaction between state and society.
Reciprocity also needs to exist that will enable groups to form and compete with each
other in the civil state realm. Reciprocity does not exist where there is no trust, as the
absence of trust renders pressure, negotiation and conflict resolution meaningless.
Accountability is another necessary element that encouiages actors to remain in the
civic state realm. Accountability enhances legitimacy and therefore proves a disincentive
for exit. Finally, governance is about the establishment of a broad-based legitimacy
through redefining the state as a body that is responsive to the needs of the broader
society. This responsiveness is reflected in the manner in which the state sector relates
to civil society and the way in which it responds to the articulated needs of society
through its policy formulation and legislative processes.
Develo mental local government is also inherentl concerned with the distribution of
resources. There are a number of areas where developmental local government is
engaged in the distribution of resources. Some of these areas of engagement are
familiar to those operating in the local government arena, as they have traditionally been
functions of local government. Other areas are new to the local government arena and
are consequently less easily accepted.
The area of land use management is one that has traditionally been undertaken by local
authorities. The allocation of land and the restriction of use of land performs a key role in
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the redistribution of resources. Land use management plans whether in the form of town
planning schemes, zoning plans or guide plans have traditionally been drawn up by
planning professionals. Therefore, this particular local government activity, while having
the potential to be developmental, is not currently so, due to limited participation in the
production of land use management plans.
In the past some of the more proactive local authorities have been involved in the
economic development of their area of jurisdiction. However, this involvement has
usually been limited to facilitating the implementation of national policies and
programmes at the local level. The focus of this type of economic development has been
on the attraction of large scale industry and the promotion of investment
(Tomlinson,1994). There has been a rapidly expanding amount of literature relating to
local economic development in post apartheid South Africa that has identified the need
for adding another element to economic development at the local level. The core activity
of this second element of local economic development is the fostering of indigenous
economic activities, which traditionally take place on a relatively small scale. A further
element that considers regeneration initiatives could be added to the approaches used in
local economic development (Dauskardt, 1994). This element of regeneration deals
specifically with the support and refocusing of established industries.
Another concern related to resource distribution is the consolidation of livelihoods in a
sustainable fashion. This area is often linked to the development of economic activity
and the management of land. An example of this linkage is where a local government
zones land for agricultural use and then invests in the basic infrastructure that allows
that land to be used for food gardens. This is a function that is not usually performed by
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local authorities, but is increasingly important in terms of a developmental mandate,
particularly in the developing world.
Local government is also required to manage the natural environment and natural
resources. This mandate has by and large been a result of the adoption of the Agenda
21 programme by the United Nation at the Earth Summit in Brazil in 1993. Agenda 21
recognised that the local level of implementation was the most practical and realistic
level at which a programme aimed at the sustainable use and conservation of
environmental resources was possible.
Developmental local government is also characterised by an outlook that is
entrepreneurial in nature (Tomlinson,1994). This does only apply to its activities when
it is engaged in local economic development, but can be extended to all its activities.
This characteristic is necessary due to changes in the way in which the global economy
operates. Cities are increasingly competing against each other for a slice of the
investment cake (Halfani, 1997). Foreign direct investment in national economies is no
longer channeled through national government but is invested directly in cities. Cities, in
order to avoid global marginalisation, need to compete directly in the global economy
and therefore need to gear up their productive capacity to do so. Developmental local
government needs to be entrepreneurial in outlook to be able to support the realignment
of this capacity.
A further characteristic of developmental local government ~ that it is engaged in
meeting the basic needs of communities within its area of jurisdiction (Swilling, 1997).
....,.. -
The provision of basic services can be divided into two areas. Firstly, local government
is responsible for facilitating and providing a range of 'soft' services such as primary
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education, primary health care and pension payout points. In mo
st cases local
government does not directly supply these services but either acts as an
agent for other
spheres of government, or at the very least facilitates the operation of the
se services.
Local 0 ernment is also responsible for the delivery of 'hard' services
suc water,
sewage, electricity, roads and storm water. Local government is usual
ly more directly
involved with the provision of these services than it is with social service
s. ,:;1U->O'"""-'-'= g-
countries local government is resRonsible for uilding and ma' ta'
ing at least a
~
minimum level of service. A minimum level of service is one that sup
plies the basic- -
needs of a household. The World Bank's (1993) minimum level of service
is as follows:
• Water supply by communal standpipe
• Bucket system or shared toilet
• Graded and gravelled main routes, and tracks
• No formal drainage
• No solid waste collection
• No electricity supply
Finally, developmental local government is characterised by an ability to facil
itate the
interaction of civil society with itself and with other civil socie
ty actors. The
communications process that drives these interactions and fraught with d
ifficulty and the
information that is transmitted is very easily distorted, although this di
stortion is often
unintentional (Forester,1980). Although Forester (1980) is mostly con
cerned with the
interactions between planners and society, his analysis can be ex
tended to any
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profession operating out of a government institution and their attempts to communicate
with the rest of society.
The goal of clear undistorted communication is ultimately the empowerment and
democratisation of communities. The assumption is that clarity of communication will
result in the efficient use of resources, as state and civil society actors will know what
opportunities are real opportunities, and what threats are real threats. In developmental
terms, therefore, local government has a crucial role to play as a disseminator of
information. This information needs to be comprehensible, sincere, legitimate and
truthful if it is to be useful to the development process
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has traced the importance of local government in the overall system of
government. A conclusion can be drawn that local government needs to be strong if it is
to achieve the aims and objectives that it sets out to achieve. It can be inferred that
strong local government is a precondition to effective developmental local government.
This is not to argue that developmental local government cannot be weak, but rather to
state that developmental local government that is strong has a greater chance of being
sustainable in the long term and able to impact the development problem in a more
meaningful way.
An analysis of the prospects for developmental local government therefore needs to
consider a range of factors. Firstly, however, developmental local government needs to
be examined in the light of the characteristics of strong local government. The second
round of analysis is then concerned with the developmental nature of local government.
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This is not to say that should local government be found wanting in terms of its
perceived strength, this second level of analysis should not be undertaken. In such a
case the second level of analysis should be illustrative of the prospects of local
government in developmental terms should the broad structural impediments to its
strength be dealt with.
'.
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Chapter 4: Local Government in South Africa
4. 1 Introduction
"It is not possible to govern a modern state without extensive local government, but it is
also impossible to govern it if local government is not responsive to the demands of a
central power, nor answerable directly to the citizens" (Scruton,1983:275). This
statement highlights three areas of importance, in terms of the prospects for the
establishment of strong developmental local government in South Africa. Firstly, local
government is necessary, secondly, local government has to be responsive to central
government and finally it has to be responsive to the local community.
An analysis of the history of local government in South Africa reveals a number of
disturbing precedents that may limit the ability of a future local government system to be
both strong and developmental. These precedents are disturbing particularly in the light
of the three areas of importance highlighted above. Furthermore, these historical
precedents may undermine the effective functioning of a future system of local
government. An analysis of the history of local government in South Africa highlights the
impact that the approach to local government during the apartheid era may have.
\
4.2 The History of Local Government in South Africa
Perhaps the most significant year in the history of local government in South Africa is
1971 especially in terms of local government in non-white areas. Prior to 1971, local
government essentially took two forms.
A limited system of local government was established in the TBVC states with traditional
leaders being given responsibility for management of the rural areas. Small rural towns
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were established in the bantustans that were known as R293 towns after the legislation
that provided for their establishment (Department of Constitutional Development,1998).
These towns had very few powers, although they had their own administrations. This
system of R293 towns still operates in former homeland areas today, although gradually
their administration and powers are being upgraded to full local council status.
The other form of local government was the white local authority. These authorities were
responsible for a full range of municipal functions, and were also responsible for areas
designated as "Coloured", "Indian" and "Black" areas under the Group Areas Act. In the
1960s, management committees were established in the "Coloured" and "Indian" areas
as advisory bodies to the white local authorities (Department of Constitutional
Development,1998). These committees had no real power and strictly performed an
advisory role.
In 1971 responsibility for the administration of the "black" townships areas was removed
from the white local authorities with the promulgation of the Bantu Affairs Administration
Act (Department of Constitutional Development, 1998). This Act made provision for the
establishment of Administration Boards. These Administration Boards were bodies
appointed by the national government and were headed up by a white townships
manager (Christianson et al,1993). The urban uprising of 1976 forced the nationalist
government to review their policy on the status of black urban residents. This shift in
thinking resulted in the creation of Community Councils, which were supposed to have a
broad range of powers.
The Community Councils Act (125 of 1977) was the enabling legislation for the
establishment of these councils and made provision for central government to transfer
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powers from the administration boards to the new community councils. In practice this
did not occur and community council became advisory bodies to the administration
boards (Christianson et aI, 1993). What was significant about the community councils
was that it represented a shift in thinking by the government. Blacks living in urban
areas, considered up until this time to be temporary sojourners, were increasingly seen
to be permanent residents. Hence, the extension of some rights to participation in local
government (Christianson et a/,1993; Parnell et a/,1998). These rights were relatively
limited and rather token in nature, but they served as a base from which the
accumulation of more meaningful political rights could be acquired..
Once the apartheid government had recognised the rights of urban blacks to dwell
permanently in urban areas and to participate in government, there was no turning back
in terms of the extension of local democracy. The lack of real power invested in the
community councils quickly caused them to lose legitimacy and to be disregarded. In
1982 the tri-cameral system of parliament, which allowed Indians and Coloureds limited
political rights at a national level, was introduced. Partly, in response to the failure of
community councils and partly as a means of placating the black population who were
not accorded national political rights, the government passed the Black Local Authorities
Act (Christianson et aI, 1993).
This Act established local authorities in the township areas that had the same status and
range of powers as the white local authorities. Due to the fact that these local
government structures were established in black areas at the same time as other
disadvantaged race groups were given limited national rights, the black local authorities
came to be "seen as a symbol of political exclusion" (Christianson et aI, 1993:15). This
was in spite of the fact that the establishment of black local authorities represented
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another shift in the thinking of national government. The Black Local Authorities Act
recognised that urban blacks were entitled to the same local citizenship rights as the
members of other population groups (Christianson et al,1993). In addition to a lack of
political legitimacy, black local authorities faced problems of capacity and severe
financial constraints.
Grassroots organisations, known as civic organisations or civics, which had been active
since the early seventies became more organised and became one of the focal points of
national resistance (Christianson et al,1994;Bernstein et al,1994). National activism was
manifested at the local level by civics attempting to make the townships ungovernable.
This resistance occurred mainly by means of civil disobedience and mass action,
particularly with regard to the payment of rates and service charges to the black local
authorities. This non-payment put the black local authorities under increasing pressure
as far as the sustainability of their financial position was concerned.
Even without the large-scale rent and services boycotts, the financial position of most
black local authorities was shaky. This was as a result of the particular form that the
urban fabric took in South Africa. Land use in South Africa was strictly segregated in a
number of senses. Incompatible land uses were separated from each other by means of
the familiar zoning schemes. However, the use of these schemes was extended to cover
more than just land use. Racial zones were also woven into the fabric of the apartheid
city. One of the most striking characteristics of these racial zones, essentially areas of
land set aside for the use of non-whites, was their uniformity of land uses. The
predominant land use in these areas was residential, with limited commercial land use
and in most cases a complete absence of industrial land use. Commercial and industrial
land uses, traditionally the mainstay of the urban rates bases were located almost
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exclusively in white areas. Black local authorities therefore had a very limited base from
which to draw income and consequently had to rely on inter-governmental transfers for
their continued operation.
It was recognised at national level that transfer to black local authorities could not
continue indefinitely. In response to the increasing financial failure of black local
authorities a quasi-governmental institution, the Regional Services Councils, were
introduced in 1985. Regional Services Councils and were intended to compensate for
the lack of a tax base in black local authorities and served two basic functions, the
provIsion of bulk service infrastructure and the redistribution of financial resources.
Regional Service Council incomes were derived from a levy on the turnover of
companies in the regional services council's area of jurisdiction, and a levy on the payroll
of the same companies (Solomon,1993a). These levies were payable regardless of
whether or not companies were located within white local authorities or not.
Although the establishment of Regional Service Councils did not usher in a radical new
conception of local government, they did signify a new understanding of the nature of the
citizenship rights of black urban residents. liThe Regional Service Council system
acknowledged that township residents were citizens of a wider city, entitled to a share of
its wealth, its municipal services and its decisions" (Christianson et ai, 1993:16).
This local government system of white local authorities, black local authorities and
regional services council operated until 1993 when the Local Government Transition Act
(Act 209 of 1993) was promulgated. The transition phase marked the end of the era of
apartheid local government. The period of local government transition since 1993 is
discussed in the following section through the analysis of various pieces of legislation
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and policy that has been produced by government. However, it is useful at this point to
step back and look at some of the themes that emerge from the history of local
government in South Africa in the period up until the transition.
An analysis of the recent history of local government in South Africa in terms of the three
aspects drawn out of Scruton's (1982) statement on the need for local government
reveals a number of key points. Local government was seen as necessary by the
apartheid regime. This statement, however, needs some qualification, as issues of good
governance and the extension of democratic practice were not objectives of the
development of the local government system. The apartheid regime made an attempt to
use local government structures to extend their control over the lives of the citizens of
South Africa, particularly the non-white populace.
It can therefore be argued that apartheid local government was never truly local
government in terms of the definition explored in the previous chapter, as it proved to be
more responsive to the needs of central government than the needs of the local
community. Furthermore, this analysis of the history of apartheid local government
emphasizes the contribution of democracy to the effective functioning of local
government. The issue of effectiveness and responsiveness to local communities is
intimately linked to the notion of democracy discussed in the previous chapter as one of
the characteristics of strong local government.
The historical analysis also highlights the manner in which local government reform has
been undertaken. The transformation of the local government system has historically
been done by means of incremental changes in a reactive fashion. The apartheid
government sought to implement changes in such a way that it was merely a reworking
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of a flawed system rather than a true change in the nature and role of local government
(Christianson et al,1993). When a facet of local government activity appeared to be
failing, central government responded in a manner that, while changing the way in which
local government operated, still made the overall achievement of the goals of the
apartheid system possible.
The reactive manner in which change in local government has occurred historically also
raises concerns regarding the future of local government, particularly if local government
change continues to occur in a reactive mode. Christianson (1994) notes that this
tendency towards reactivity was present at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa
(CODESA) negotiations, where local government was removed from the main agenda at
the national level. Local government issues were eventually given voice at a separate
Local Government Negotiating Forum (Christianson, 1994;Bernstein,1994).
In spite of its lack of responsiveness to the local community, some form of local
government has always been present and is therefore easily targeted when grievances
are vented. Resistance to the apartheid system was most strongly manifested at a local
rather than a national level. Apartheid based local government was therefore a logical
target for resistance and animosity.
The resistance to the apartheid system of local government has not been without its
costs. Local resistance, particularly non-payment of local taxes and service charges, has
resulted in the poor functioning of service provision systems. The cost of eradicating
infrastructure and social servi?e backlogs is going to be high (World Bank,1993).
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However, the delivery of these services is critical if local government institutions are to
be seen by local communities to be different from apartheid structures. This perception
that local government is pursuing a post apartheid agenda must be developed in order to
give local government an opportunity to establish itself as an agent of delivery. However,
increasing local taxation to raise the necessary revenues may undermine this perception
of local government, even if it is made clear that the increased revenues will be spent on
development related projects. Furthermore, more aggressive taxation policies may
cause more affluent citizens and firms to relocate elsewhere, which would further
undermine the ability of local government to deliver (Dunleavy et al,1987).
The first part of this chapter has begun to sketch out some of the lessons that can be
learned from the way in which local government was institutionalised during the
apartheid era. It has also highlighted a number of constraints on the development of
future local government systems. These constraints arise from the actions performed by
the apartheid state in response to the perceived failure of the local government system
as well as from the response of the anti-apartheid movement to the change.
Among these lessons and constraints are the limits to future change imposed by the
reactive reform that has taken place in the past. A future system of local government
needs to be proactively instituted and focussed on the development problem, and should
ideally be recreated rather than reformed. Furthermore, the development of local
government in South Africa has left many of these institutions in a financially vulnerable
position. The patterns of urban development do not lend themselves to effective
management by local authority institutions. The space economy was fragmented by
apartheid authorities on the basis of racial concerns, and while the physical form of
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urban areas is changing gradually, this change is occurring at a slower rate than the
change that is occurring in the social and political realms.
4.3 The Post-Apartheid Local Government Transition
The evolution of local government since 1995 will now be examined by looking at the
main pieces of legislation and policy that have been put in place to manage the transition
and to give direction to the reform of local government structures. This analysis will
initially look at the Constitution as it sets the broad framework in which local government
has to operate. Legislation and policy emerging from national government is then
examined in chronological order. Some of the earlier legislation, such as the Local
Government Transition Acts, were put in place before the Constitution was passed in its
final form. However, the Constitution had been in existence in a draft and an interim
format before the promulgation of these acts and hence the decision to initially discuss
the Constitution.
4.3.1 The Constitution
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) sets out very clearly
the fundamental principle by which the country is to be governed. The institution of local
government is considered to be an important component of the governance system, and
accordingly has been allocated an entire chapter in the Constitution. An amendment to
the Constitution in the form of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second
Amendment Act (Act 87 of 1998) was specifically concerned with the extension of local
government activities (Republic of South Africa, 1998a).
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The Constitution attempts to give some strength to the local sphere of government in
5151 (4) where it states that "the national or a provincial government may not
compromise or impede a municipality's ability or right to exercise its powers or perform
its functions" (Republic of South Africa, 1996:63). This clearly enables local government
to be strong in respect to its role in the broader system of governance. In reality these
rights to operate as an independent entity are limited by later provisions as well as by
other pieces of legislation and policies.
./
The developmental potential of local government is picked up in s152, where the
objectives of local government are set out. In short s152 gives local government the
responsibility for providing democratic and accountable government, ensuring the
sustainable provision of services, promoting social and economic development and the
promotion of a safe and healthy environment (Republic of South Africa, 1996).
Section 153 gives the developmental duties of local government a basic needs focus.
This section suggests that local government should not only look outward to other
spheres of government to fund development projects, but should also try to channel
internally sourced funding to such projects.
The nature of the relationship between local government and other spheres of
government is clarified in s154, which introduces the notion of co-operative governance.
Onus is placed on national and provincial government to support the activities of local
government (Republic of South Africa, 1996).
Sections 155 to 164 establish a framework for the establishment, composition and
operation of local government entities, of which there are three types. These issues are
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further elaborated on and formalised in local government legislation aimed at supporting
the transition process.
The Constitution in effect sets the broad parameters for a new form of legitimate and
effective local government. It envisages a system of local government where local
institutions are strong and effective. Local government is also seen to be developmental
in nature, although this developmentalist element has a strong basic needs focus.
4.3.2 The Local Government Transition Acts
Following negotiations at the Local Government Negotiating Forum, the Local
Government Transition Act (Act 209 of 1993) was promulgated. Amongst other things,
this Act set out a three phase framework for the transition of local government. The first
two phases of this transition are set out in detail, while the third phase is alluded to, but
is seen by the Act to be the subject of further legislation.
The first phase of the transition was the pre-interim phase. This phase required that local
negotiating forums be established in local areas. These forums would be representative
of both black and white local authorities, as well as political parties active in the area.
These forums were not democratic entities but rather interim bodies tasked with
ensuring that services continued to be delivered to the local community. Furthermore,
these forums had to lay the foundation for the system of local government that would be
put in place after a multi-racial local government election. To this end these forums had
to establish a boundary for the local government entity, choose a local government
model, register voters and delimit voting wards (Solomon, 1993b).
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The Act also allowed the administrator, or premier after the national elections in 1994, to
act if local authorities failed to establish local negotiating forums or undertake any of the
required tasks. This was done to prevent former white local authorities from 'cherry
picking' areas that were developed and would not impact on the standard of service
delivery that they offered to their white constituencies. White local authority areas had to
be linked with disadvantaged areas. Already at this pre-interim stage the potential of
local government to redistribute resources was recognised and encouraged (Van
Ryneveld,1994).
The pre-interim phase of local government came to an end with the local government
elections in November 1995 in seven of the nine provinces, and in the remaining two
provinces in April 1996. Local negotiating forums were replaced by transitional local
councils, which then became the institution responsible for the management of local
authority functions for the transition phase.
The transition phase was envisaged to last until the following round of local government
elections five years after the first. The transitional local councils operating during this
period were not envisaged to be the final post apartheid form of local government. The
final form of local government would be developed during the transition period and
relevant legislation would be put in place that would facilitate the outcomes of this
process (Sutcliffe, 1999).
The Local Government Transition Act (Act 209 of 1993) set the stage for the transition,
and anticipated as far as possible some of the stumbling blocks that the transformation
of local government might run into. However, it became necessary in 1995 to amend the
Act in order to deal with some of the unforeseen outcomes of the transition, and to refine
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some of the procedures and processes outlined in the first act. The Local Government
Transition Act Second Amendment (Act 89 of 1995) details the nature and function of
rural local government. This type of local government was referred to in the original Act,
but was never explicitly dealt with.
The importance of the two acts relate to the way in which they reconceptualise the role
of local government by bringing together advantaged and disadvantaged areas, and
requiring that the disadvantaged areas be developed. The aim of the acts was to begin
to even out some of the spatial and organisational anomalies created by the system of
apartheid through the creation of single local authorities with a single tax base, which
could benefit particularly the residents of the more disadvantaged areas.
Prior to these two acts the focus of local government, in the case of white local
authorities, was to provide a high level of services to the local community. In the case of
black local authorities, the aim was to keep control of a growing population of urban
blacks. The local government transition acts provided a new rationale for the existence
of local government, and in so doing provided some of the seeds for the notion of
developmental local government that would be further expanded upon in the White
Paper on Local Government.
4.3.3 The White Paper on Local Government
The White Paper on Local Government, which was published in March 1998, is probably
the definitive policy document emanating from central government with regards to the
transformation of local government. The "White Paper maps out the future of local
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governments", and is the basis upon which the latest set of legislation relating to local
government matters is based (Tsedu, 1998:14).
The White Paper on Local Government sets out its own approach to developmental local
government, which is not entirely the same as the approach set out in the discussion of
developmental local government in the preceding chapter. The differences and
similarities between the two conceptions of developmental local government are dealt
with in the final section of this chapter.
The White Paper expands on three key concepts that relate explicitly to the
transformation of local government. These three concepts are developmental local
government, co-operative government and the revised institutional system. While the
White paper also examines other areas such as political, administrative and financial
systems, these issues flow from the three key concepts. The three key concepts are
critical to developing an understanding of developmental local government.
The clarification of the concept of developmental local government is based on the role
of local government as outlined in the Constitution. One of the main funclions 0 I~I
government is the addressing of services and backlogs and the inequalities associated
~ith the apartheid spatial economy (Department of Constitutional Development,1998).
The developmental role of local government is characterised by a closely knit matrix of
interrelated objectives, functions, roles and outcomes. The objectives of developmental
local government are contained within the following four tasks that local government
entities are expected to take the lead in:
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• Maximising economic growth and social development
• Integrating and co-ordinating a range of services and regulations
• Democratising development, empowerment and redistribution
• Leading and learning
(Department of Constitutional Development, 1998)
Local ise economic rowth and social development by
*shifti it focus from the provision of high level services to the provision of basic
household infrastructure. This shift requires that projects are undertaken that encourage
local disadvantaged communities to become involved in the formal sector. The aim of
these activities is the alleviation of urban poverty.
Human rights issues aside, one of the main criticisms of the apartheid system was its
obscene wastefulness in terms of scarce resources. Functions and activities were often
duplicated and uncoordinated. This represents a huge opportunity cost to society. The.
focus on integration and co-ordination at the local level is intended to reduce this
opportunity cost thereby freeing up resources for productive investment.
l...and IIse-p!ar.lr.li.Ag.,-bouseboJJ 'nfrastruclure, el1Yironmental management, trans!2ort,
hea and education safet and security and housing, as well as the activities of other
spheres of government and service providers within the area of jurisdiction of a local
authority, are identified in the White Paper as the key areas in which integration and co-
ordination needs to take place. The complexity of co-ordinating and integrating this wide
range of activities means that some sort of plan needs to be put in place by local
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government. The White Paper advocates the use of integrated development planning as
a tool to achieve integration and co-ordination.
While the necessity of an integrated plan in the medium to long term is not disputed the
White Paper does not appear to take cognisance of the fact that such planning studies
are time consuming exercises in two ways. Firstly, at least six months is required to
develop a plan for a local area that adequately reflects the needs and aspirations of the
local community. Secondly, the local capacity necessary to implement the plan once it is
completed is often lacking, particularly in smaller local authorities. While the plan is
being drawn up and local capacity developed, expectations are being built up in the local
communities who are demanding immediate delivery. The White Paper, while
advocating integrated development planning, has very few ideas on how to balance
short-term delivery imperatives with medium and long term planning exercises. The fact
that expectations are being raised by provincial and national politicians, while local
politicians are expected to deliver, further exacerbates this problem.
The apartheid system marginalised many groups, which were then faced with two
choices. Either these groups could organise themselves and overtly or subversively
agitate for change and reform, or they could remain marginalised. The civic movement
has its roots in resistance to attempts by the apartheid government to marginalise black
urban residents. Such organisations have been very vocal and articulate in putting
forward the needs and aspirations of their constituents3 . Other groups that have been
unable to organise as well, have been marginalised further. Local government has the
3 However. since the advent of democracy civic groups appear to have faded from the political scene and have tended to
focus on local development rather than political isues.
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responsibility for identifying these groups and bringing them into the developmental
realm.
The facilitative nature of developmental local government is brought out in the concept of
leading and learning. This firmly places local government activity in the realm of
governance, where local government is involved as a partner in development with the
local community and civil society. In order to be developmental, local government
institutions need to act as a catalyst in the development process.
The white paper identifies two tools, which local government can use to assist in the
fulfillment of its development mandate. The first tool, which has already been discus~ed,
is integrated d lop ent planning. The second tool is known as performance
management and is related to integrated development plans. Performance management
is done by measuring goals achievement against a set of key performance indicators
(Department of Constitutional Development, 1998). ,These key performance indicators
should ideally be linked to the integrated development plan and have been developed in
close consultation with local co~nities. When the actual delivery of development is--measured against key performance indicators, the extent to which the integrated
development plan is being implemented becomes clear.
The second key concept elaborated on in the White Paper on Local Government is that
of co-operative governance. Prior to 1994, the South African state was arranged in a
very hierarchical manner. A very powerful central state handed down decrees to a weak
and ineffectual provincial government, who then assisted local government in the
implementation of these decrees. Local government, although exercising a significant
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degree of power in the local arena, had very little impact on national policy (Department
of Constitutional Development, 1998).
The White Paper on Local Government proposes an alternative model of inter-
governmental relations. The essence of this model is illustrated in Figure 2 below.
<.....-->
Figure 2: The Co-operative Model of the State (Department of Constitutional
Development,1998)
Figure 2 essentially illustrates the fact that no one sphere of government can be
considered to be the most important. This model recognises that each sphere of
government has a particular role to play as far as reconstruction and development is
concerned, and should be given the freedom to play that role. The model also suggests
that various synergies exist between the different sphere of government that enables
them to collaborate in meaningful ways.
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It is debatable whether or not such a free and equal relationship between the various
sphere of government actually exists in South Africa. Christianson et al (1993) points out
that the strong centralist tendencies of national government may hinder the development
of strong local government. The presence of the provincial sphere also has a dilutory
effect on the ability of local government to fulfil its mandate (Cox,1994).
A typology of local government is the third key concept presented in the White Paper on
Local Government. Three potential types of local government, are specified, Category
(A), Category (8) and Category (C) municipalities. The nature and role of Category (A)
municipalities is very clearly spelt out in the White Paper on Local Government. The
relationship between Category (8) and Category (C) municipalities is less clearly
articulated.
Category (A) municipalities are those that can be found in metropolitan areas. A
Category (A) municipality has both executive and legislative authority for its area of
jurisdiction. Six areas in South Africa have been granted metropolitan status and will
have Category (A) municipalities (Department of Constitutional Development,1998).
These areas are Greater Johannesburg, Greater Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban, Lekoa-
Vaal and Khayalami.
It is interesting to note that three of these metropolitan areas are located in Gauteng,
South Africa's smallest province in terms of physical size but largest in terms of
economic output. Similarly, the other proposed metropolitan areas have high
concentrations of economic activity. Due to the large economic surpluses these areas
generate and their large diverse areas of jurisdiction, they are particularly important in
terms of redistribution.
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Category (C) municipalities will form the local government institution that will be
responsible for all areas outside of Category (A) municipality areas, including all areas
that currently form TLCs. These municipalities will be known as Di~trict Councils and will
have executive and legislative authority over an area that includes more than one
Category (8) municipality (Department of Constitutional Development,1998). Initially, all
local government functions and mandates will be vested with the District Councils,
including those of Category (8) municipalities (Sutcliffe,1999).
Category (8) municipalities have executive and legislative authority over an area that
makes up part of a Category (C) municipality. Category (8) municipalities will consist of
former transitional local council areas as well as rural and traditional areas. In this way a
Category (C) municipality (District Council) will have "wall to wall" coverage of Category
(8) municipalities within its area of jurisdiction (Sutcliffe,1999). The administrative
centres of Category (8) municipalities will most likely be located in the largest former
transitional local council area within the new boundary demarcation.
The institutional model proposed for local government in the White Paper on Local
Government is intended to ensure that rural areas are not left behind when it comes to
the delivery of development. It can be argued that transitional local councils should
remain and development investment should be concentrated in urban areas where the
'social rate of return' is relatively high. A high social rate of return is indicative of lower
cost per capita for access to some form of development service.
Recovery of service charges, particularly in former black local authority areas, is not high
and this has placed a number of transitional local councils in a vulnerable financial
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position. The expansion of the areas of responsibility from transitional local council areas
to larger rural areas may expose local government to higher levels of risk. The White
Paper on Local Government suggests that a system of inter-governmental transfers may
be a solution to this problem (Department of Constitutional Development,1998).
However, a reliance on funding from other governmental sources becomes problematic
when viewed from a strong local government perspective, particularly where conditions
are attached to the use of this funding.
4.3.4 The Municipal Trinity
The White Paper on Local Government is the basis on which the future system of local
government is to be developed. To this end the models and systems proposed by the
White Paper on Local Government has been translated in the "Municipal Trinity", a set of
three acts of parliament that will govern the way in which local government is established
and operates.
Currently, the Trinity consists of two acts and a bill, with the bill expected to be passed
by government early next year. The first of the acts to be passed was the Local
Government: Municipal Demarcation Act (Act 27 of 1998). This Act allows for the
establishment of an independent authority that will be responsible for the demarcation of
the boundaries of Category (A), Category (B) and Category (C) municipalities. The Act
also lays out a set of criteria and procedures for the demarcation of municipal
boundaries (Republic of South Africa, 1998b).
The second Act that was passed is Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act 117
of 1998). This Act sets out criteria for the determination of Category (A), Category (B)
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and Category (C) municipalities (Republic of South Africa,1998c). It also gives details of
how functions are to be devolved from Category (C) municipalities to Category (B)
municipalities (Republic of South Africa, 1998c). In addition, the Act gives guidance as to
the manner in which the internal functioning of local authorities should take place
(Republic of South Africa, 1998c).
Sections of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) have
been found to be in conflict with the constitution (Xundu et al,1999). The sections that
were found to unconstitutional relate to the powers of the Minister of Provincial and Local
Government. The original act gave national government powers that allowed the Minister
of Provincial and Local Government to determine the category of municipality an area
would have and to provide guidelines for the determination of municipal categories. An
amendment bill has already been drawn up that removes these powers from the Minister
of Provincial and Local Government and vests them with the Demarcation Board
(Republic of South Africa, 1999a).
The findings of the Constitutional Court have been described in some quarters as a
victory against the Minister of Provincial and Local Government's '''encroachment' on
provinces and municipalities" (Xundu et aI, 1999: 1). The findings of the Constitutional
Court are significant from the point of view that the constitutional conception of local
government as a strong institution in an equal relationship with other spheres of
government has been upheld.
The Local Government: Municipal Systems Bill, which is expected to be passed into law
in the first parliamentary session of 2000, is the third component of the Trinity. This Bill
outlines the principle, mechanisms and processes that are necessary to facilitate the
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establishment of a developmental system of government that can implement social
upliftment policies and ensure broad access to services (Republic of South
Africa, 1999b).
The bill also provides a framework for the four core elements of the transformation
process. Firstly, an integrated development planning process and system is detailed,
which is supported by performance management, the second core component. The
mobilisation of appropriate resources and need for organisational change and
development are the remaining two components. Detailed process and procedures are
laid out in the bill, as well as recommendations for the substantive contents of these
various elements.
There is a danger that the bill is too overly prescriptive in this respect and that the
recommendations may not be sensitive enough to the context in which the municipality
operates. The early drafts of the regulations for the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and
Development Act detailed the process and contents of development plans. Later drafts
stepped back from this prescriptive approach and provided broad guidelines, as
development planning practitioners often found it difficult to apply all elements of the
regulations to their planning exercises.
Finally, the bill sets the 'rules of the game' for interactions between other sphere of
government. The bill allows for support, monitoring and intervention by other spheres to
facilitate the evolution of local government institutions into effective development
agencies. The devolution of powers and functions that national and provincial
government have been unable to perform has been one of the salient characteristics of
inter-government relations during the transition. In many cases, assistance with funding
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was withheld and local government was saddled with a number of unfunded mandates.
The Municipal Systems Bill prevents another sphere of government from devolving the
mandate to perform a particular function, without the associated transfer of funds.
4.4 Conclusion
Local government under the apartheid state was focussed on political control. Since
1994, an attempt has been made to establish local government as an equal and
independent institution. However, it seems that the tendency remains to attempt to
concentrate power in the centre and dictate to the local level as the recent Constitutional
Court case regarding the constitutionality of the Local Government: Municipal Structures
Act (Act 117 of 1998) illustrates (Xundu et a/,1999).
As far as the concept of developmental local government is concerned, the White paper
on Local Government outlines a very simple basic needs understanding of the concept,
in that it focuses on redistribution rather than balancing these concerns with economic
growth. The notion of developmental local government in the preceding chapter is
slightly more complex and gives more focus to the economic development aspect of the
concept, as well as the relationship of this aspect to the delivery of social and
engineering infrastructure. The approach of the White Paper on Local Government in
this regard may be the more realistic one as it recognises the dire lack of capacity at
local level and argues for a 'walk before you walk approach'.
While there may be some problems with the implementation of the institutional models
put forward by the White Paper on Local Government, the theory behind the arguments
appears to be sound. However, the White Paper on Local Government can be criticised
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from the point of view that its argum
ents are often utopian in nature. The
characteristics
of strong local government discussed
in the preceding chapter suggest an
institution that
is both dynamic and flexible. Utopian
thought, however, is characterised by
the opposite,
a pursuit of a static ideal end sta
te (Hall,1995). The use of utopian
arguments is
inconsistent with the stated aims
of a dynamic form of local gover
nment that is
responsive and has the ability to
learn and therefore adapt to chan
ging contexts.
Perhaps more importantly the assum
ption has been made that the capacit
y to implement
the envisaged form of government e
xists. This fundamental assumption i
s clearly flawed
as a basis for building a system of d
evelopmental local government. The
model of local
government put forward by the W
hite Paper on Local Government
may not be
achievable for this reason.
The following chapter traces the his
tory of a small town in the KwaZulu-
Natal Midlands
through the last years of the apart
heid state and through the current
period of local
government transition. This is done
in order to assess the likelihood that
the institutional
models proposed for the post-tra




Chapter 5: The Mooi River TLC: A Case Study
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will examine the experience of the Mooi River Transitional Local Council, a
small town in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands and attempt to unpack its experience of the
local government transition. The first part of the chapter puts the Mooi River TLC in
context by looking at its history, its demographic characteristics and elements such as
topography, spatial structure and levels of service provision. The chapter also outlines
the current institutional set up in the TLC. The Mooi River TLC is currently facing an
uncertain future, the reasons for which relate directly to the development issues
confronting the town.
The second part of the chapter will assess the experience of the Mooi River TLC in
terms of the four characteristics of strong local government, and the five characteristics
of developmental local government. The aim of this analysis is to assess the future
prospects for strong developmental local government in the region. Chapter Three
strongly suggested that local government, at least from a theoretical point of view, has
an important role to play in the delivery of development. Chapter Four suggested that the
legacy of apartheid and the post apartheid response to this legacy may constrain the
development of a system of developmental local government in the future. This chapter
will examine if this is actually the case, and will attempt to identify some constraints to
the fulfilment of this role by local government.
The information presented in this chapter comes from a number of sources. The author
was involved in a local development planning exercise in the Mooi River TLC during the
course of 1999. The information presented here comes from various reports prepared as
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part of this process, previous planning studies done in the area, interactions with the
project steering committee, and a series of informal int9rviews undertaken with key
informants living in and around the Mooi River TLC.
5.2 The Mooi River TLC in Context
5.2.1 The Mooi River TLC in its Regional Context
The Mooi River TLC is located in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands, approximately seventy
kilometres north west of Pietermaritzburg. The N3 national highway that links Gauteng,
the industrial heartland of the country, with Durban, the country's dominant port, bisects
the town. The town is also located on the main railway line that runs from Johannesburg
to Durban. Figure 3 on the following page puts the town in its regional context.
The Mooi River TLC was formed out of three previously separate towns prior to the 1995
local government elections. The former township area of Bruntville is located to the east
of the N3 national highway, while the town of Mooi River is located to the west of the
same highway. The Mooi River TLC also includes the small settlement of Rosetta
located fourteen kilometres south of the town of Mooi River. The phrase 'Mooi River
TLC' will be used to refer to all three components of the town collectively. A reference to
'Mooi River' refers to the former white town west of the N3 national highway, while
references to 'the Mooi River' refers to the river that runs through the town.
5.2.2 The History of the Mooi River TLC
Early development in the Mooi River area occurred to the east of where the Mooi River
TLC is currently located. The main road between the town of Estcourt to the north and











SWK,1995). Development related to the movement of goods and people began to occur
in this area. A bridge was built across the river in 1866 and by 1872 a township by the
name of Western had been laid out and a hotel, a store and a church had been built on
the southern side of the Mooi River (Seneque Maughan-Brown SWK,1995).
In 1879 Alexander Lawrence purchased the farm of Grantleigh to the west of Western.
The Mooi River TLCs central business district is currently located on the site of this farm
(Seneque Maughan-Brown SWK,1995). The spatial form of the Mooi River TLC was
determined by the construction of a railway line two kilometres west of the Township of
Western in 1844. The line was constructed away from Western due to technical reasons
(Seneque Maughan-Brown SWK,1995). Lawrence sold the land required for the railway
reserve on the condition that a stati.on be built and that trains would stop in the town
(Seneque Maughan-Brown SWK,1995). Development gradually moved westwards and
clustered around the station area. As a result of this movement of activity and
development the main road was also shifted to the alignment of the present day R103
(Seneque Maughan-Brown SWK,1995).
The nature of the town had changed from a stop on the transit route inland to a market
where local farmers could sell their produce and export it to other areas of the country.
Along with this function the town began to develop a service centre function to the
surrounding farming activities. This growing role also led to the development of a small
agro-processing industry (Seneque Maughan-Brown SWK,1995). Most of this activity
was related to Natal Co-operative Dairies and to the Mooi River Bacon Factory. The
town is no longer involved in agricultural processing since the Bacon factory
amalgamated with the Estcourt Bacon Factory and moved to Estcourt, and the dairy
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operation closed due to pressure in the broader industry (Seneque Maughan-Brown
SWK,1995).
After World War Two the economic base of the town diversified as a result of the
construction of a textile factory in the town. The town was an attractive location for
industry due to a range of industrial incentives offered by the national government, as
well as the availability of infrastructure, water and labour (Seneque Maughan-Brown
SWK,1995).
The townships of Old Western, New Western, Grantleigh and Lawrenceville were
amalgamated in 1921 and the first town board of Mooi River was created (Seneque
Maughan-Brown SWK,1995). Shortly after the textile was established in the town,
Councillor Brunt donated a portion of her farm for the settlement of the black workforce
used in the textile factory (Seneque Maughan-Brown SWK,1995).
Since the establishment of the factory the town has been managed in a conservative
manner, which has been very responsive to a vocal anti-development faction
(Venables,pers commt The local economy has failed to diversify and as a result, the
town now finds itself in a vulnerable position. The closure and relocation of the key
agricultural processing concerns during the eighties and early nineties had a significant
impact on the economy of the town. These industries were not replaced, and the partial
shutdown of the textile factory in June 1999 has left the town in a state of crisis.
4 Chairman of the Mooi River Chamber of Commerce, Rosetta, 28th May 1999.
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5.2.3 Demographic Characteristics
The following figures relating to the population of the Mooi River TLC are based on the
database developed by Scott Wilson (1998) for the purposes of assisting with the
preparation of the iNdlovu Regional Plan.
Population projections based on the 1991 census estimate that the population of the
Mooi River TLC to be 8 405 people. Fifty-one percent of the population is male. The bulk
of the population, fifty-two percent, falls into the economically active age cohort. Forty-
one percent of the population is under the age of eighteen. Six percent of the population
is over the age of sixty-four. This population distribution between various age cohorts
further suggests that the Mooi River TLC is a reception area for migrant labour.
Average household size is estimated to be approximately 5.12 people per household. It
is therefore estimated that there are around 1643 households located within the Mooi
River TLC. Most of these households (ninety-four percent) are accommodated in formal
housing, while only three percent of households are accommodated in informal
structures. These housing figures are largely reflective of the low income housing
developments that have been undertaken in the last five years.
The poverty datum line for the iNdlovu Regional Plan was set at R840 per month per
household (Scott Wilson,1998). On this basis it was estimated that 38% of the
households living in the Mooi River TLC area could be considered poor. It must be noted
that this measure of poverty reflects only cash remittances. However, the figures are
high enough to be a cause of concern, particularly in the light of the job losses at the
textile factory and the shaky financial position of the Mooi River TLC.
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Only 22% of households have an average monthly inccme of more than R3650 per
month. This section of the population is usually responsible for the financial support of
the town through the payment of rates and property taxes, and the payment of service
charges. This suggests that a situation may be developing where a few households are
required to support many more. It is felt that this situation is not one that is sustainable
(Macallister,pers comm)5.
5.2.4 Economic Aspects
The economy of the Mooi River TLC is dominated by the primary sector and the
activities that service those industries (Seneque Maughan-Brown SWK,1995). In spite of
the fact that the agro-processing factories have either closed or moved, the Mooi River
TLC is still an important provider of services to the surrounding farming communities.
The agriculture sector is focused mainly on the production of beef and dairy, although
the farming areas surrounding the Mooi River TLC are renowned throughout South
Africa for their stud farms.
Historically, the manufacturing sector, particularly the textile and clothing sub-sector has
also made an important contribution to economy of the Mooi River TLC. During its hey-
day the Mooi River Textiles factory employed 1350 people (Seneque Maughan-Brown
SWK,1995). The factory produced yarn and woven fabric for the national market. The
factory wound up most of its operations in June 1999, and currently only the Cut, Make
and Trim department is still operational. The reasons advanced for the closure relate to
the entry of the South African clothing industry into the global economy, and the fact that
the South African sector is not competitive (Venables,pers comm)6. Furthermore, the
: Town Clerk of Mooi River, Mooi River, 26th November, 1999.
Chairman of the Mooi River Chamber of Commerce, RoseUa, 28th May 1999.
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factory's labour force was highly unionised and it was suggested by the owners of the
factory that this was a key contributing factor to the uncompetitiveness of the factory.
The closure of the textile factory has impacted the Mooi River TLC in a number of ways.
Firstly, a large number of jobs has been lost and while an attempt is being made to offset
some of these losses through small scale local economic development projects, these
projects are not recreating jobs on the same scale as they were lost. Furthermore, the
employment that is created through these local economic development projects is not
necessarily being taken up by former textile factory workers.. The loss of jobs has had
an impact on the ability of households living in the Mooi River TLC to pay rates, property
taxes, and service charges. This is significantly affecting the Mooi River TLC's revenue
stream. The Mooi River TLC is also more directly affected as the textile factory is no
longer paying rate and property tax to the TLC. Furthermore, the Mooi River TLC used to
derive seventy percent of its income from the sale of electricity to the textile factory.
As has already been mentioned, the Mooi River TLC performs a service centre role for
the surrounding rural hinterland. The Mooi River TLC provides a range of banking,
personal and retail services for this hinterland. The location of the Mooi River TLC in
terms of Johannesburg Durban holiday traffic has prompted the TLC's Local Economic
Development Committee to investigate the possibility of expanding tourism facilities in
the town (Scott Wilson,1999). The Mooi River TLC already forms part of the Midlands
Meander, an arts and craft route which winds its way along the R103 between
Pietermaritzburg and Mooi River. A piece of land has been made available for the
development of a tourism information office.
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Informal economic activity is also taking place in the Mooi River TLC. This activity is
located mainly around transport nodes and in the former township area of Bruntville. The
informal activity in Bruntville is a result of apartheid planning policies that limited the
extent of commercial activities that were permitted to take place in African townships.
Much of this activity seems to be undertaken by women and is focussed on the sale of
foodstuff and household consumables.
5.2.5 Spatial and Physical Characteristics
It has already been mentioned that the Mooi River TLC consists of two geographically
distinct areas, Mooi River and Bruntville, and the small town of Rosetta, 12 kilometres
south of Mooi River. Figure 4 on the following page gives an idea of the spread of actual
and proposed land uses in TLC area, as well as the location of the TLC's main
structuring elements.
Two 'hard' linear elements and one 'soft' linear element bisect the Mooi River TLC. The
railway line and the N3 national highway are the hard elements, while the Mooi River is
the third softer element. The presence of three edges of limited penetrability has
contributed to a fragmented and disjointed spatial form. The former White and Indian
areas of Mooi River are located west of the N3 national highway, while Bruntville is
located to the east. One of the key problems facing post apartheid planners revolved
around the integration of these disjointed areas. Although the various residential areas
are spatially separate, the Mooi River TLC is relatively small, and the central business










































Apart from the textile factory, which is located south of Mooi River in one of the Mooi
River's meanders, industrial activity is located to the north of the TLC along the R103.
Commercial activity is concentrated around the railway station. Similar to the town, the
central business district is also fragmented, as it is cut almost in half by the railway line.
Due to security reasons, pedestrian access across the railway line has been completely
restricted and the only link between the two halves of the central business district is over
the bridge that also provides road access.
Shortly after the 1995 local government elections, the Mooi River TLC drew up a
housing waiting list for the TLC. A set of criteria was applied to this housing list in order
to identify potential beneficiaries for a low-income housing project. A group of
approximately 200 households was identified as potential beneficiaries and a low-
income housing project was undertaken to meet this demand. This development was
located south of Bruntville along the N3 national highway.
Shortly afterwards the Mooi River TLC was approached by a developer interested in
developing more low-income housing in the TLC. The councillors gave the go ahead for
the construction of almost 2000 low-income houses, despite a lack of support from
officials. Once this housing was completed there was an influx into the Mooi River TLC
of low-income households that had previously been living outside the TLC. Many of
these new residents were 'dumped' in the Mooi River TLC in response to new legislation
promulgated by the Department of Land Affairs that extended security of tenure to
farmworkers. The new residents were not used to paying rates and property taxes, or for
the use of services. As a result the Mooi River TLC has had to face the prospect of an
increasing population that is unable to pay for services.
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The small town of Rosetta consists of a small strip development of mainly tourist related
commercial activity along the R103. Residential land uses are clustered to the west of
the R103 and the railway line runs along the eastern edge of the town. As is the case
with Mooi River, housing for the lower income groups is separated from the remaining
land uses by a hard edge, in this case the railway line.
5.2.6 Institutional Dynamics
The Mooi River TLC is run by an executive committee that consists of a mayor and ten
councillors. Nine of these councillors are aligned to the African National Congress, one
is aligned to the Democratic Party. The executive committee is responsible for taking all
major decisions that affect the TLC and is assisted in this task by the Town Clerk and
the Town Treasurer.
The day to day functioning of the Mooi River TLC is the responsibility of the Town Clerk
and his team of officials. The TLC has the following departments that are responsible for





• Parks and Gardens
• Traffic
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All local authority functions that do not fall under the auspices of these departments are
carried out by the Town Clerk.
Like many other local governments in the post apartheid era, the Mooi River TLC has
had to undergo rapid change and adjustment. In this process, unfortunately, the TLC has
made a number of mistakes. Some of these mistakes have been extremely costly and
have brought the town to its knees. The development of the 2000 low income housing
sites is a good example. However, councillors and officials alike are aware of these
mistakes and appear to have learnt from them. Faced with the same choices now, it is
unlikely that the TLC would make the same mistakes again (Macallister,pers commf.
5.2.7 Development Issues
Four clear development issues have been identified in the Mooi River TLC area (Scott
Wilson,1999; Riel and Associates,1999). Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, is the
need for economic regeneration in the town. In response to the closure of the textile
factory, the Regional Economic Forum, in association with the Department of Economic
Affairs and Tourism, commissioned consultants to investigate the option for the
regeneration of the local economy. This process led to the establishment of a Section 21
(not for profit) company that has been tasked with the investigation, planning and
negotiation of new projects that will precipitate economic growth in the broader KwaZulu-
Natal Midlands Region (van Duffelen,1999). The initial focus of their activity, however,
will be in the Mooi River TLC area.
The second development challenge facing the Mooi River TLC is the upgrading of
disadvantaged areas, in terms of engineering services and social facilities. The spatial
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focus of this challenge will be in Bruntville and the settlement to the east of the railway
line in Rosetta. The two former Indian areas in Mooi River also need attention in this
regard, although the provision of engineering and social services is higher in these areas
than in the former black townships.
The first two challenges are in some senses diametrically opposed. Economic
regeneration implies the generation of wealth and the accumulation of capital and
wealth, while service provision requires a capital outlay, which in some cases may not
be recoverable. The third challenge, therefore, is the management of these opposing
dynamics in a manner that ensures the long term financial sustainability of the TLC.
The final challenge facing the Mooi River TLC is the building of appropriate capacity that
will enable both councillors and officials to meet the first three challenges (Scott
Wilson,1999). As the development of the 2000 Iow-income housing sites illustrated,
there was a lack of understanding on the part of the councillors as to what would be the
implications of the development of the project. The officials on the other hand were
unable to effectively communicate their concerns about financial sustainability to the
councillors.
5.3 An Assessment of the Mooi River TLC
Chapter Three of this dissertation outlined four key characteristics of strong local
government, and five key characteristics of developmental local government. This
section looks at the case of the Mooi River TLC in the light of these characteristics in an
attempt to assess, firstly, whether or not strong developmental local government is in
fact attainable. Secondly, this analysis is undertaken in an attempt to identify key
7 Town Clerk of Mooi River, Mooi River, 26 th November 1999.
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contributing factors to the successful implementation of strong developmental local
government.
Strong local government is characterised in the first instance by its role in the broader
system of government, as well as its relationship with other spheres of government. In
the early stages of the local government transition, the Mooi River TLC appears to have
engaged well with the other spheres of government. A low-income housing project was
undertaken that made use of provincial housing board funding. Furthermore, funding
was obtained from the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme for the
provision of additional infrastructure for the new development area as well as the areas
of Bruntville with infrastructure that required augmentation.
In some sense, local government in the Mooi River TLC can be seen to have been too
strong for its own good and hence able to proceed with developments it could not
realistically sustain. However, the blame for this cannot be completely laid at the door of
the TLC. Much of the funding for the 2000 unit low-income housing development was
sourced outside the TLC. The government departments and programmes offering this
funding, were pursuing political agendas that were not necessarily in the interests of the
Mooi River TLC, and seemingly felt no need to withhold funding. In this sense the Mooi
River was quite weak in that they were unable to resist the imposition of other agendas
on the TLC once they had started the ball rolling.
The second characteristic of strong local government is its ability to raise and spend
revenue. The Mooi River TLC is strong in the sense that it is able to spend all revenue
raised within its area of jurisdiction as it sees fit. However, the weakness of the Mooi
River TLC is revealed in its inability to raise the necessary revenue that will enable it to
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fulfil its developmental mandate. Non payment of rates and service charges, as well as
the loss of revenue from electricity sales has put the Mooi River TLC in a very vulnerable
position.
The inability of the Mooi River TLC to raise revenue through the usual mechanisms
suggests that it may not have been completely successful in extending democracy to
local communities. The ability of local government to extend democracy is the third
characteristic of strong local government. This argument is based on the assumption
that the more local communities perceive local government to be legitimate and
effective, the more likely they are to respond to calls for service and rates payments. An
attempt was made at running a Masakahne campaign in the Mooi River TLC but it had
very little effect.
The lack of extension of democracy in the Mooi River TLC is further highlighted by the
fact that the TLC was unaware of the profitability problems of the textile factory until it
announced its imminent closure. Strong local government has a strong and open
relationship with civil society actors and the private sector. In the case of the Mooi River
TLC these actors clearly did not consider themselves to be constituents of the TLC. The
closure of the textile factory also highlights the inability of the Mooi River TLC to
intervene in what has become a serious threat to the long term future of the TLC.
The final characteristic of strong local government is the depth of the capacity of the
local authority to fulfil its envisaged role. A brief analysis of the capacity of the Mooi
River TLC suggests that a lack of strength as far as this characteristic is concerned may
be at the root of many of the challenges facing the TLC.
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This lack of capacity is a problem that faces both the political and the administrative
components of the Mooi River TLC. Nine of the ten councillors elected in the 1995 local
government elections were from disadvantaged backgrounds and had very little
experience of local government, although they were well versed in grassroots
democracy. This inexperience, coupled with external political pressure to redistribute
resources, made an important contribution to the position in which the Mooi River TLC
currently finds itself.
On the administrative side, the TLC officials have struggled to refocus their activities on
the demands of a local government system with a significantly different mandate.
Furthermore, senior officials have resigned and have not been replaced. Two
departments, the Public Works Department and the Electricity Department, are currently
being run by junior officials under the guidance of the Town Clerk who is not an expert in
these areas. The Town Clerk, who is retiring in June 2000, has admitted to being
bewildered at the stream of new legislation and policy relating to local government
management that crosses his desk (Macallister,pers comm)8. In spite of extensive
advertising, suitably qualified candidates have yet to be found to fill his post and those of
the heads of the two engineering departments (Macallister,pers commt
While the Mooi River TLC cannot be considered to be weak, it can hardly be considered
strong either. The lack of appropriate capacity appears to be a major problem. The fact
that suitably qualified candidates cannot be found to fill the vacant senior management
positions suggests that this capacity problem may not necessarily be only a local one.
6 Town Clerk of Mooi River, Mooi River, 26th November 1999.
9 Town Clerk of Mooi River, Mooi River, 26th November 1999.
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Having established the relative strength of the Mooi River TLC, it is n
ow possible to
examine the extent to which the TLC can be considered to be developme
ntal.
The first characteristic of developmental local government is that it
has geared its
activities to the pursuit of governance. The difficulties that the Mooi Rive
r TLC seems to
have run into with regard to extending democracy, in many ways also re
flect the inability
of the Mooi River TLC to shift from government to governance. There is a
level of conflict
between the councillors and the officials and between the TLC and actors
in civil society.
Under these situations it is difficult to develop the trust and accountabilit
y necessary for
governance to take place. Furthermore, conflict of this nature undermine
s the perceived
legitimacy of local government, as it gives the impression that local go
vernment is not
responsive to the needs of local communities and civil society.
The low levels of governance are further reflected in the apparent la
ck of common
purpose in the Mooi River TLC. Attendance at workshops that were hel
d as part of the
local development plan process was overwhelmingly black, while att
endance at the
workshops that were held as part of the economic regeneration strate
gy process was
overwhelmingly white. It appears that the local development plan w
orkshops were
associated with the proVision of services and social facilities and were th
erefore a 'black
thing'. The economic regeneration strategy workshops were seen to be
for the benefits
of the TLC's businessmen and were therefore a 'white thing'. There wa
s no sense that
both elements were intimately related and that they should be con
sidered equally
important by the residents of the TLC. The Mooi River TLC while attend
ing both sets of




The second salient characteristic of developmental local government is its focus on the
distribution and redistribution of resources. At first glance, the Mooi River TLC has
grasped the importance of this particular element of the new local government paradigm
and pursued it with vigour. Various infrastructure and housing related projects have been
undertaken, undoubtedly to the benefit of the Mooi River TLC's residents.
The Mooi River TLC has an environmental management plan, which was developed as
part of the local development plan. As this plan is still in the early stages of
implementation, it is not possible to pass comment on the impact that it is having on the
distribution of resources. The Mooi River TLC also actively manages the distribution of
resources through the administration of its town planning scheme.
The two areas of resource distribution relating to the promotion of economic activities
and the consolidation of livelihoods have largely been removed from the Mooi River TLC
and have been vested with the Midlands Investment Initiative. The Mooi River TLC,
although an active part of this initiative, is not responsible for driving the process of
economic regeneration. Capacity in local economic development and local economic
planning does not exist within the Mooi River TLC and it is therefore unable to fulfil this
mandate.
The third characteristic of developmental local government, its entrepreneurial nature
can be subject to the same analysis. The Mooi River TLC has had its hands full
engaging in various crises that have comes its way in the previous five years. It has only
just been able to expand service delivery and maintain eXisting infrastructure. With all its
energy focused on these aspects it has not been able to develop entrepreneurial or
management capacity. As is the case with economic regeneration and the consolidation
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of livelihoods, outside pressures have forced the Mooi River TLC to relinquish this
responsibility to an institution that has the appropriate capacity.
The fourth characteristic of developmental local government is that it is actively engaged
in the delivery of social and engineering services. At first glance it appears that the Mooi
River TLC can be considered to be developmental in the light of this characteristic, as
least as far as the provision of engineering services is concerned. However, the question
arises as to whether or not the levels of service provision provided by the Mooi River
TLC are sustainable in the long term.
The levels of service provision, particularly in the new development areas, are relatively
high while affordability levels appear to be low. Ideally levels of service and affordability
levels should be equally matched in order that that the recovery of service charges can
cover the cost of maintenance and future augmentation. The mismatch of levels of
service and affordability levels suggests that the M,ooi River TLC may run into problems
in the future when infrastructure requires maintenance. The decision to install a high
level of service was based on political considerations and reflects a lack of experience in
matters related to sustainable urban development.
The final characteristic of developmental local government relates to its role as a
facilitator of development. The Mooi River TLC has played this role to a degree,
particularly as far as the delivery of housing and engineering infrastructure. However, the
TLC has not been able to act decisively in the area of economic regeneration and as a
consequence no longer has the primary responsibility for this aspect. The Mooi River
TLC, however, does have a role to play in assisting the Midlands Investment Initiative
with the administrative and statutory aspects of development in its area of jurisdiction.
94
An example of this assistance is the fast tracking of development applications through
official systems and procedures.
5.4 Conclusion
In summary, it can be said that the local government institutions operating in the Mooi
River TLC are neither strong nor developmental. As a result of external shocks, weak
internal management and low levels of capacity, the Mooi River TLC has been unable to
develop over the last five years. On the surface it appears that some progress has been
made, however, more detailed investigation reveals that the long terms costs of this
progress threaten the future of the TLC.
The case study is useful in highlighting two key issues that impact directly on the ability
of local government to be strong and developmental. Firstly, the development agenda is
being pushed very strongly by other spheres of government. In the case of Mooi River
this aggressive advocacy of development delivery has not been to the benefit of the
TLC. Development has been undertaken in reactive, ad hoc and uninformed manner. As
a result the long term future viability of the Mooi River TLC is at risk.
Secondly, the inability of the Mooi River TLC to resist this pressure has been as a result
of low levels of capacity and experience on the part of all actors. Unfortunately, this
lesson has been learnt at great cost. In many ways the decisions that were taken that




This dissertation has attempted to unpack the notion of developmental local government
and to explore its future prospects, particularly as far as the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands are
concerned. This was done by firstly examining the notion of government and the state
and contrasting these concepts against what many consider to be their antithesis, the
market. In this way an understanding was developed of the way in which an institution
such as the state could to bring its particular position in the political economic
environment to bear on the development problem.
The notion of the state was then disaggregated and the focus was shifted to the local
sphere or tier of government. The discussion revolved around the potential role that local
government could play in the delivery of development and an argument was developed
that places local government at the frontline of development activity. In order to fulfil this
role, however, local government needs to be both strong and developmental. A number
of characteristics of strong local government were identified as benchmark against which
the case study could be measured. Strong local government has:
• Relative autonomy within the broader framework of government.
• The ability to raise revenue and spend that revenue at its discretion.
• A high level of administrative and technical capacity.
• Operates on principles that are fundamentally democratic in nature.
These characteristics of strong local government were then augmented by a number of
characteristics of developmental local government. This argument was based on the
assumption that in order to be effectively developmental in outlook, local government
institutions also have to be strong. Developmental local government is characterised by:
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• A focus on governance rather than government.
• An explicit focus on the distribution and redistribution of resources.
• An entrepreneurial nature.
• A focus on the provision of economic, social and engineering services.
• The free flow of information.
In order to provide a background to the case study, a brief history of the local
government milieu since the 1950s was provided. A number of trends were identified
and analysed as part of this process. In order to finally place the case study in a
meaningful context, an analysis of the legislation and policy governing the transition
between apartheid local government and post-apartheid local government was
undertaken. This analysis concerned itself with the constitution, the white paper, the
various transition acts and the 'municipal trinity', the suite of three pieces of legislation
that deal with the future shape of local government.
The characteristics of strong and developmental local government were then applied to
the Mooi River TLC, the largest TLC in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands area. An
assessment of the strength of the Mooi River TLC on the basis of these criteria revealed
that the Mooi River TLC is neither strong nor developmental.
An attempt to identify a reason for this led to the conclusion that there is a critical lack of
capacity at the local level, which is hindering the movement of local government towards
stronger, more developmental forms. While the systems governing the mandates and
operations of local government have changed rapidly since the 1994 national elections,
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appropriate capacity to implement these new forms of local government has not
developed. To a large extent the people responsible for implementing the new systems
of government at the local level have been left behind. Whether this is by accident or
design is a moot point, but the fact remains that developmental local government can
never be a reality while there is a critical lack of capacity at local level.
The lack of capacity has also affected the relative power of local government to fulfil its
mandate. Certain powers and responsibilities for elements of the developmental
mandate that would strengthen and entrench the position of local government in the
overall system of government, have been siphoned off to non-governmental institutions.
The prime example in the case of the Mooi River TLC is the Section 21 company that
has been established to deal with the economic development mandate in the Mooi River
TLC and environs. While local government is expected to play an active role in these
institutions, this situation is unlikely to result in the development of capacity at the local
level.
What is also clear is that local government, while potentially powerful in its own realm,
very rarely has influence on any larger scale. Local government is put in a position
where it has to respond to external shocks both internally and externally. These shocks
occur at various scales from the global to the sUb-regional. The impact of the entry of the
South African economy into the global economy on the clothing and textile sector is a
good example. Local government, in the case of the Mooi River TLC, has fallen victim to
a larger set of global forces.
This disempowerment is also evident at the sub-regional scale, just one level up from
the local level. The Mooi River TLC has struggled to slow the migration of agro-
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processing industries to the Estcourt TLC, the self styled agro-processing center of
KwaZulu-Natal, and finds itself unable to halt the transfer of firms out of the TLC.
Rather than the redistributing of power to the local level, other spheres of government
need to take on an advocacy role on behalf of local government. This would show
evidence of reciprocity as local government can be said to advocate for the national and
provincial spheres of government at the local level. Programmes and planning initiated
need to take cognisance of the potential impact that these actions might have at the
local level.
Local government clearly has a role to play in the delivery of development to previously
disadvantaged groups. At the moment, however, historical baggage and other
constraints, most notably the lack of capacity, are hindering the ability of local
government structures to fulfil this role. The process of change and development is likely
to be incremental and slow, but it should continue to be pursued with vigour, bearing in
mind the end result of effective delivery.
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